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Notes
Rajneeshpuram: Religion Incorporated
The first amendment of the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ."I These two clauses, known
as the establishment clause and the free exercise clause respectively, es-
tablish the constitutional mandate of government "neutrality" toward
religion. 2 Government 3 must steer "a neutral course between the two
Religious Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other."'4 Yet, while neutrality is the central principle of both clauses,
there is no single standard for determining what is a religiously neutral
act.5 Instead, the neutrality, and hence permissibility, of a governmental
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See generally P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962); J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1029 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as J. No-
WAK]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 813-15 (1978).
The first amendment guarantees religious and governmental automony, and reflects the
view that religion and government can best flourish independently of the other. In general, the
religion clauses are thought to "encompass a unitary guarantee of separation and freedom;
[that is,] separation guarantees freedom and freedom requires separation." Pfeffer, Freedom
and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV.
561, 564 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Dilemma]. Under this theory, separation
and freedom are not considered as separate concepts or principles, but rather as two sides of a
single coin. L. PFEFFER, The Case for Separation, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 52, 60 (J. Cogley
ed. 1958).
3. The free exercise clause was held applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). The establishment clause was held applicable to the states in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
5. J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1029. The Supreme Court itself recognized the lack of
guidance:
[I]t is evident from the numerous opinions of the Court, and of justices in concur-
rence and dissent in the leading cases applying the Establishment Clause, that no
"bright line" guidance is afforded. Instead, while there has been general agreement
upon the applicable principles and upon the framework of analysis, the Court has
recognized its inability to perceive with invariable clarity the "lines of demarcation in
this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S, 756, 761 n.5 (1973) (citing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion in WalT, attempted to set forth a standard by draw-
ing an analogy between an equal protection analysis and a freedom of religion analysis:
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act must be examined in terms of the challenge to that act. 6
Rajneeshpuram, an incorporated Oregon city dedicated to the
teachings of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, represents a challenge to this con-
stitutional mandate of governmental "neutrality." Bhagwan Shree
Rajneesh, an Indian guru,7 and his disciples have made Rajneeshpuram
their home. The Bhagwan's followers incorporated Rajneeshpuram as an
Oregon municipality,8 where they have created a unique religious com-
munity dedicated to the teachings and messages of Rajnheeshism.9 The
city, incorporated as the fulfillment of a religious vision, naturally raises
new questions for the interpretation of "separation of church and state."
In light of the number of religious communities throughout the nation
and the current Supreme Court's increasing willingness to "accommo-
date" religion,10 Rajneeshpuram will represent an important constitu-
tional question for the first amendment.
This Note presents the United States Supreme Court's test for evalu-
ating establishment clause challenges, adopted in Lemon v. Kurtzman,I
and then analyzes the incorporation of Rajneeshpuram under that test.
The analysis discusses whether the incorporation violates the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment by "establishing an impermissible
Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis. The
Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to
eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. In any particular case the critical ques-
tion is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can
be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the nat-
ural perimeter.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., separate opinion). The Court, however, has never adopted
Harlan's approach. "Instead, the Court has reviewed the claims under the different clauses on
independent bases and has developed separate tests for determining whether a law violates
either clause." J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1029.
6. As the Supreme Court stressed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984): "[W]e
have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in
this sensitive area." Id. at 1362. "In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed per
se rule can be framed." Id. at 1361; see also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773; Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz, 397 U.S. at
668 ("the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a statute").
7. Bhgwan Shree Rajneesh left his ashram, or community of Hindus, in Poona, India,
and came to the United States in 1981. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1983, at A14, col. 2 (city ed.).
Rajneesh means "the blessed one" in Hindi. Id. He and his followers, called "Rajneeshees" or
"Sannyasins," started a commune in Montclair, New Jersey, in late 1981. The group left New
Jersey and settled on a ranch in central Oregon. Id. The Bhagwan and his disciples currently
reside on the ranch and have incorporated a part of it as a municipality called Rajneeshpuram.
Id.; see infra notes 80-87 & accompanying text; see also ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 1984, at 28-29.
8. See infra notes 80-87 & accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 129-33 & accompanying text.
10. This notion of "accommodation" was first expressed in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312-14 (1952) (upholding a program of release-time for prayer outside public school
premises).
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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union between religion and government." The Note also considers
whether Rajneeshpuram's sharing of state revenues violates the establish-
ment clause by providing constitutionally prohibited aid to religion. The
Note then addresses the free exercise implications that a denial of munic-
ipal status and revenue distribution might raise. The Note concludes by
appraising the relevance of each religion clause to the instant case and
suggesting an analysis that would preserve the Court's neutral path. Spe-
cifically, the Note determines that Rajneeshpuram's existence results in
establishment clause violations, while the lack of incorporated municipal
status will not impinge on the free exercise of its inhabitants.
Establishment Clause Precedent
The United States Supreme Court has applied the establishment
clause12 to correct or prevent acts of the government "respecting an es-
tablishment of religion." 13 As the Supreme Court has often noted, the
drafters' choice of the word "respecting" was not inadvertent. The draft-
ers of the Constitution did not merely wish to preclude the actual "estab-
lishment" of a state church or a state creed; rather, they sought to outlaw
any enactment that might constitute "a step that could lead" to the unity
of government and religion. 14 In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jeffer-
son, the first amendment seeks to erect, as near as possible, "a wall of
separation, between church and state."15 In particular, the drafters be-
lieved that individual religious liberty could be safeguarded only if gov-
ernment "was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to
assist any or all religions," 16 and conversely that only by "rescu[ing] tem-
poral institutions from religious interference" 17 could the civil liberties of
the population be preserved.
To ensure these protections, the United States Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman18 consolidated the current tripartite test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of government action under the establish-
ment clause. 19 First, the government action "must have a secular
12. For a discussion of the reasons that compelled the framers to incorporate the estab-
lishment clause into the constitution, see McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213-26
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15, 28-48 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-3, at 816-19.
13. U.S. CONST. amend I.
14. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Ever-
son, 330 U.S. at 41-46 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
15. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 493; Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
16. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
17. Id. at 15 (citations omitted); see L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-3, at 816-19.
18. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down two state programs that provided financial aid to
nonpublic schools).
19. Id. at 612-13. This test has been reaffirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3221-22 (1985); Thorton v.
Calder, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2917 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1985);
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legislative purpose;"' 20 second, "its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;" 2 1 and third, it must not
foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 22 The
Lemon Court held that a failure to satisfy any one of these three require-
ments would be sufficient to render the challenged act unconstitutional. 23
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
748 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
790-92 (1983) (Lemon test not applied); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 251-55 (1982)
(Lemon test held not applicable).
Recently, Justice Brennan praised the Lemon tripartite test as being well tailored to fur-
ther establishment clause principles:
This well defined three-part test expressed the essential concerns animating the Es-
tablishment Clause. Thus, the test is designed to ensure that the organs of govern-
ment remain strictly separate and apart from religious affairs, for a "union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion." And it
seeks to guarantee that government maintains a position of neutrality with respect to
religion and neither advances nor inhibits the promulgation and practice of religious
beliefs.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1372 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
For a discussion of the genesis and development of the Court's tripartite test, see Note,
Property Tax Exemption fo' Religiously Owned Property Used Soley for Religious Purposes
Held Not Violative of the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment, 16 VILL. L. REV. 374
(1970).
20. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
21. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). This second prong of
the Lemon test demonstrates the polar forces of the religion clauses. Advancing religion con-
stitutes establishment, but inhibiting religion means prohibiting its free exercise, which the
Court has held also constitutes a violation of the separation of church and state. Constitutional
Dilemma, supra note 2, at 565-66 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)).
For an application of this dual violation concept, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1978)). The
excessive entanglement concept is thought to introduce into religion clause jurisprudence a
"phrophylactic dimension." Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten
Year Assesment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (1980). "Administrative relationships be-
tween religious and civil authorities are forbidden not only when they result in government
support or direction of religious enterprises but also when they are 'pregnant with dangers of
excessive government direction' of such enterprises." Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620).
In attempting to reduce potential church-state strife, "[r]elationships which might cause relig-
iously-based disputes are forbidden-whether or not any real friction between the church and
civil state is actually present." Ripple, supra, at 1200-01 (emphasis in original). Further, a
secondary role for "excessive entanglement" is to act as an " 'early warning system' for more
traditional establishment clause hurdles," such as the question of primary effect. Id. at 1203
(citing Nyquist, 403 U.S. at 798).
23. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3,
168 (1971); Note, State Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools Held Violative of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 17 VILL. L. REV. 574, 581 (1972). It has
been suggested that the latter two factors are both "effects" tests; the former focuses on the
effects of the government action on religion while the latter focuses upon the effects of the
government action on the relationship existing between church and state. Id. at 581. The
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The Lemon test has been applied by the Supreme Court either to strike
down or uphold legislation in various arenas of conflict: sabbatarian ex-
emptions, 24 conscientious objector status, 25 and school prayer.26 Two
arenas, however, are particularly analogous to the focus of this Note and,
therefore, will be examined more closely: aid to religious institutions and
delegation of governmental authority.
Aid to Religious Institutions: Lemon v. Kurtzman27
An important arena in which the Supreme Court has had ample
opportunity to apply the three-part Lemon analysis is government finan-
cial aid to religious institutions. 2 8 The opinion in Lemon itself illustrates
the Court's approach in this area.
relationship between the second and third phases of the test appear "to be such that where the
degree of advancement of religion is slight and subordinate, a greater degree of entanglement
would be justified." Id. at 581 n.52. "On the other hand, where the advancement of religion is
significant and substantial, a significantly lesser degree of entanglement would be sufficient to
render a program unconstitutional." Id.
24. See, eg., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961). In these so-called "Sunday Closing Law" cases, the Supreme Court
found that laws proscribing certain business activities on Sundays were not necessarily moti-
vated by religion and, hence, were not laws "respecting an establishment of religion." Mc-
Gowan, 366 U.S. at 445. The Court reasoned that such laws had become an inherent part of an
effort to improve the health, safety, and general well-being of this country's citizens, wholly
apart from its original genesis in religion. Id. The Court stated that to strike down such laws
would be to give a "constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than
one of mere separation of church and state." Id. The Court also held that such laws did not
violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Id. at 453. Two years later, the Court
held that it was a violation of the free exercise clause to deny employment conpensation to a
Seventh-Day Adventist who would not accept an available position that would require her to
work on Saturdays. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963).
., 25. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-57 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In
Welsh, Justice Harlan described the issue in the case as whether a statute that defers to an
individual's "views emanat[ing] from adherence to theistic religious beliefs is within the power
of Congress." Id. at 356. He stated that in order to pass muster, such a statute, having chosen
to exempt, "cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one
hand and secular beliefs on the other," for such distinctions are not compatible with the neu-
trality mandated by the establishment clause. Id.
26. See, eg., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Engel, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a New York law allowing state officials to compose a prayer and require that it be recited
each day, despite the fact that the prayer was nondenominational and pupils who did not want
to participate could be excused. Id. at 425-26. One year later, the Court struck down a Penn-
sylvania law permitting state officials to require a reading from the Bible or a recitation of the
Lord's Prayer. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963). The Court
did not, however, speak in absolutes. Should study of the Bible or religion be presented objec-
tively as part of a secular program of education, the Court reasoned that it would comport
with the principles of the first amendment. Id. at 225; see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980).
27. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
28. See, eg., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding New
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Lemon involved state financial aid programs in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island. 29 The Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act 30 provided for the "purchase" of certain secular edu-
cational services from nonpublic schools. The statute authorized the
Pennsylvania Superintendent of Public Instruction to reimburse eligible
schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials.
31
Reimbursement was prohibited for any course that contained subject
matter expressing religious teaching or the morals or forms of worship of
any sect.32 Similarly, the 1969 Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act
33
authorized state officials to pay a salary supplement directly to teachers
of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools. 34 Both statutes were
carefully drafted to ensure that aid was provided only to the secular as-
pects of parochial education. 35  Under both state systems, however,
Catholic schools were the main beneficiaries of the programs. 3
6
Both state programs were challenged under the establishment clause
York statute involving reimbursement to nonpublic schools for reporting attendance and grad-
ing state prepared tests).
To summarize the status of the law respecting church-related educational institutions,
there is no constitutional barrier to supplying health, nutritional, and similar therapeutic and
remedial services. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). Further, it is
permissible to finance school transportation, see id. at 16-17, and to loan secular textbooks at
the elementary and secondary school levels. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
248 (1968). The scope of permissible governmental financing is broader at the college or uni-
versity level. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976) (upholding
noncategorical grants to church-affiliated colleges for non-sectarian purposes); Hunt v. Mc-
Nair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973) (upholding the issuance of public bonds to finance construction
of non-sectarian facilities by church-affiliated colleges). For a fuller discussion of this area, see
generally J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1032-49.
29. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Purdon 1968).
31. Id. § 5604. An eligible school was required to keep a record of secular education
costs, as opposed to religious instructional expenses, in its accounting procedures. The
school's accounts were subject to state audit. Id. § 5607. Also, payment for secular services
was restricted to the following courses offered in the public school system: mathematics, mod-
em foreign languages, physical science, and physical education. Id. § 5604; see also Lemon,
403 U.S. at 609-11.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5603(3) (Purdon 1968).
33. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-51-1 to 51-9 (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1980).
34. Id. The salary supplement could not exceed 15% of an eligible teacher's salary nor,
as supplemented, could the recipient's salary be greater than the maximum salary of public
school teachers. Eligible teachers were required to agree not to teach courses in religion and to
teach only certain subjects offered in public school system. The materials used must be the
same as those used in public schools. In addition, the eligible teacher must have been teaching
in a nonpublic school where the average per pupil expenditure on secular instruction was less
than the average state expenditure. The Act required eligible schools to submit financial data
to the State Commission of Education in order to distinguish secular education costs from
religious instruction expenditures. Id; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-09.
35. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-09, 613.
36. Id. at 609-11.
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of the first amendment.37 After examining the "cumulative criteria"
gleaned from prior cases38 dealing with the establishment clause, the
Court enunciated its three-part test for determining whether an act
passes muster under that clause.39 The Court then applied the new test
to the two state programs. The Court found that both statutes passed the
"secular purpose" test,4° and that it was unnecessary to consider their
"primary effect."'4 1 The "excessive entanglement" criterion, however,
proved to be the determinative factor.42
In order to determine whether the statutes successfully met the "ex-
cessive entanglement" standard, the Court focused on three sub-factors:
"the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority. '43 Considering fac-
tors such as the proximity of the schools to churches and the pervasive
religious atmosphere inside the classrooms, the Court first concluded
that parochial schools constituted "an integral part of the religious mis-
sion of the Catholic Church." 44 Because the states' parochial school sys-
tems were essentially similar, the Court found that both systems had a
substantial religious character and purpose.45
The nature of the aid that the two statutes provided also militated
against their approval. Both acts authorized supplementing the salaries
of teachers of secular subjects. 46 Non-ideological assistance, such as
transportation and secular textbooks, had been held constitutionally per-
missible,47 but the Lemon Court reasoned that "teachers have a substan-
tially different ideological character from books."' 48 Thus, the Court
suspected that this aid could possibly lead to dangerous church-state en-
tanglements. For example, parochial school teachers could be seriously
37. Id. at 608, 611.
38. In particular, the Court discussed Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611-13.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The Court accepted the statement of purpose offered by
both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania: "to enhance the quality of the secular education in all
schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Id.
41. Id. at 613-14. Relying on the defect of excessive entanglement, the third prong of its
test, the Court did not decide whether the effect of the legislative programs would violate the
establishment clause. Id. See J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1034, in which the authors view the
Court's discussion as indicating that it would have found a prohibited effect in these programs
had it analyzed the cases under this prong of the Lemon test.
42. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
43. Id. at 615.
44. Id. at 616.
45. Id. at 616, 620.
46. Id. at 607-11.
47. See supra note 28.
48. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
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impaired in their duties if they had to avoid mingling religion with secu-
lar subjects. 49 The Pennsylvania statute had the additional defect of pro-
viding financial aid directly to the parochial schools. 50
The Court concluded that the above factors gave rise to "entangling
church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to
avoid."' 51 In order to effectively supervise such programs and to satisfy
the first amendment, "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance [would] inevitably be required . .. "52 Moreover, the
Court feared that these statutes would engender a divisive political at-
mosphere by polarizing voters along religious lines. 53 As a result of this
analysis, the Court declared the two state statutes unconstitutional. 54
Delegation of Governmental Authority to Religious Organizations: Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc. 5 5
As Justice Black forcefully noted in Everson v. Board of Education :56
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: . . .Neither a state nor federal government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa."' 57 Regardless of the precise phraseology describing this
first amendment mandate, the Supreme Court clarified in Larkin v. Gren-
del's Den, Inc.,58 that at minimum it precludes a state from ceding gov-
ernmental powers to a religious organization. 59
Grendel's Den, Inc., a restaurant, was denied a license to sell alco-
holic beverages by a local Massachusetts licensing agency. 60 Under Mas-
sachusetts law, the issuance of a liquor license could be prohibited if the
applicant's place of business was located within a 500-foot radius of an
objecting church or school.6' The Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverage
Control Commission sustained the Cambridge License Commission's de-
49. Id. at 618-19.
50. Id. at 621. In the opinion of the Court, this factor clearly distinguished it from the
statutes involved in Everson and Allen. Id.
51. Id. at 616.
52. Id. at 619.
53. Id. at 622.
54. Id. at 607.
55. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
56. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
57. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
58. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
59. The Grendel's Den Court also pointed out that "[a]t the time of the Revolution,
Americans feared not only a denial of religious freedom, but also the danger of political op-
pression through a union of civil and ecclesiastical control." Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 127
n.10; see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1978). See generally B. BAILYN, IDEO-
LOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 98-99 n.3 (1967).
60. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 117-18.
61. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1974).
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nial of the liquor license solely on the basis of an objection submitted by
the Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Church, which was located ten feet
from the restaurant. 62 Grendel's Den brought an action against the state
and city licensing commissions challenging the validity of this Massachu-
setts law under the establishment clause of the first amendment. 63 The
Supreme Court held that the delegation to churches of the power to veto
applications for liquor licenses violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment. 64
The Grendel's Den Court commenced its analysis by recognizing the
state's power to protect the environment around certain institutions
through the exercise of reasonable zoning laws.65 The Court noted that
judicial deference to the exercise of zoning powers in the area of liquor
regulation is particularly appropriate in light of the states' extensive pow-
ers under the twenty-first amendment.6 6 The majority stated, however,
that because the Massachusetts statute delegated to religious entities the
power to veto certain liquor license applications, it was not afforded the
judicial deference warranted by a legislative zoning judgment. 67 When
the exercise of a state's power to zone pursuant to the tenth and twenty-
first amendments impinges upon the guarantees of the establishment
clause, the Court reasoned that the former must give way to the latter.68
The court, referring to Thomas Jefferson's concept of a "wall of sep-
aration,' ' 69 explained that the establishment clause grew out of a belief
that religion and government must be insulated from each other in order
to coexist.70 The Court recognized that a limited degree of entanglement
is inevitable in a modern society, but viewed vesting discretionary gov-
ernmental power in a religious body as a substantial breach of the "wall
of separation."'71
Next, the Court turned to an analysis of this "breach" under the
Lemon test. It acknowledged that the state has a legitimate governmen-
62. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 118.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 120.
65. Id. at 121.
66. Id. at 121-22 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106-10 (1980); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972)).
67. 459 U.S. at 122 (citing Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 83,
89, 384 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (1979)). The Court based this conclusion on the most recent con-
struction of the statute by the highest Massachusetts court. 459 U.S. at 122 n.4 (citing Arno,
377 Mass. at 89, 384 N.E.2d at 1227).
68. See Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 122 n.5.
69. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 122 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1879)) (quoting Reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association (January 1, 1802), reprinted in 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113
(Washington 1861)).
70. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 122.
71. Id. at 123.
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tal interest in protecting the environment around certain institutions.
72
Thus, the statute had a valid secular purpose, satisfying the first require-
ment of Lemon.73 The Court found, however, that the primary effect of
the section advanced religion because the standardless delegation of veto
power empowered churches to promote "explicitly religious goals,"'74 a
result proscribed by the second prong of the Lemon test.
Applying the third prong of the Lemon test, the majority reasoned
that Massachusetts law resulted in the very "fusion of governmental and
religious functions" that was feared by the framers when the establish-
ment clause was adopted. 75 The Court found that by substituing the un-
guided and unilateral power of a church for the reasoned decision-
making of a legislative body, "the statute enmeshe[d] churches in the
processes of government."' 76 In holding that the Massachusetts statute
violated the third prong, the Court concluded that "few entanglements
could be more offensive to the spirit of the Constitution. 7
7
Having reviewed establishment clause precedent on financial aid and
governmental delegation of authority to religious organizations, this
Note now examines the incorporation of Rajneeshpuram.
The City of Rajneeshpuram78
The Incorporation of Rajneeshpuram79
In 1981, the Indian guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and his followers
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 125-26. The majority was concerned that the statute enabled the church to
"favor liquor licenses for members of that congregation or adherents of that faith" as well as to
insulate itself from undesirable neighbors. Id. The majority concluded, however, that regard-
less of the probability of such action by the church, the establishment clause required some
guarantee that the delegated power would be exercised in a religiously neutral way. Id.
75. Id. at 126-27 (quoting in part Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)). The Court first noted that it had not previously considered the entanglement implica-
tions of a statute vesting significant governmental authority in churches. 459 U.S. at 126.
76. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 127. The Court also noted that such an entanglement
presented the opportunity for "political fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines."
Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623).
77. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 127.
78. The current status of Rajneeshpuram and its activities are in perpetual fluctuation.
Hence, the following set of facts might not represent a definite factual description of
Rajneeshpuram, but rather is a compilation of presently known and assumed legally operative
facts. The sources of these facts are provided throughout the section.
79. This analysis focuses on Rajneeshpuram. In March 1982, however, disciples of
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh moved into the neighboring town of Antelope, Oregon, which
consisted of approximately 45 residents. On April 5, 1982, the citizens of Antelope held a
special election to vote on the issue of Antelope's disincorporation. The outcome of this
election kept the City's status unchanged. Letter from Mayor of the City of Rajneesh to
[Vol. 36THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
RAJNEESHPURAM
purchased a 64,22980 acre parcel of land8 in rural Wasco County, Ore-
gon.82  Thereafter, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and his followers,
"Rajneeshees," took the necessary steps to incorporate over 2,000 acres83
of the parcel, now known as Rancho Rajneesh,84 as a municipality. On
Author dated Sept. 19, 1984 (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Mayor's Letter to Author].
Since 1982, the disciples have constituted a majority of Antelope's residents, established
several businesses, occupied five of the six city council seats, had one representative on the
Antelope School Board, and elected one of their members as mayor. The new city council then
established a nudist park, enacted the first city property taxes, increased the water rates and
hired a Rajneeshee as City Attorney. Washington Post, July 30, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
On September 18, 1984, the citizens of Antelope voted to change the city's name to the
City of Rajneesh. The City of Rajneesh now has a population of 95. At a recent City Council
meeting, the City of Rajneesh appointed one of the council members as Peace Force
Commissioner and voted to create their own peace force to provide police protection. Mayor's
Letter to Author, supra. The Rajneesh City Council has also granted Rajneesh Investment
Corporation (RIC) a conditional use permit to place 48 apartment units on two parcels of land
that the corporation owns in the town. Oregonian, Oct. 17, 1984, at C5, col. 5.
Although they share similar characteristics, Rajneeshpuram and the City of Rajneesh
might be legally distinguished in the context of the establishment clause on the basis of the
state's involvement in their respective incorporations. Rajneeshpuram with its infrastructure,
as discussed infra text accompanying notes 95-128, was proclaimed a municipal incorporation
by Wasco County, a political subdivision of Oregon state. The City of Antelope, on the other
hand, was a preexisting municipal corporation operating under Oregon law before the disciples
constituted a majority of its citizens. The State of Oregon merely acknowledged the name
change. This distinction allows for different conclusions as to whether the state's acts violate
the establishment clause. See infra text accompanying notes 172-213.
In light of the similarity of the two cities' organizational infrastructure, however, a court
could still conclude that an excessive intermingling between church and state existed in the
City of Rajneesh. See infra text accompanying notes 193-211. A court could also conclude
that state revenue sharing by the City of Rajneesh violated the first amendment. See infra text
accompanying notes 222-64. It is important to note, however, that any differences between
the two cities' power distribution and land ownership may alter these conclusions. For
example, if the City Council of the City of Rajneesh merely consists of Rajneeshees without the
pervasive overlapping of authority among the various religious organizations, discussed infra
text accompanying notes 95-128, the City of Rajneesh would have a much stronger free
exercise claim that could tip the balance in the favor of its constitutionality. See infra text
accompanying notes 292-301. For a similar comparison between Rajneeshpuram and Utah
cities predominantly made up of Mormons, see infra notes 149-69 & accompanying text.
80. 64,229 acres is more than twice the size of San Francisco. 21 FUNK & WAGNALLS
STANDARD REFERENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA 7794 (1969).
81. The Secretary of the Bhagwan picked the site for the Commune and religious city.
San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 23, 1984, at A24, col. 6.
82. Wasco County is a political subdivision of the State of Oregon with a population of
approximately 22,000 inhabitants. San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 17, 1984, at Al. col. 5.
83. Subsequently, the City annexed 119 additional acres; however, the Oregon Court of
Appeals in Perkins v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 68 Or. App. 726, 686 P.2d 369 (1984), affirmed
the Land Use Board of Appeals order disallowing the City's annexation of 119 acres of agricul-
tural land, and its rezoning of the land for urban use. This decision is likely to be appealed.
Hence, the exact city limits are presently undefined.
84. Washington Post, July 30, 1983, at A3, col. 1. The Rajneeshees have converted
Rancho Rajneesh into a self-sufficient agricultural community. Oregonian, April 22, 1984, at
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November 4, 1981, the Wasco County Court ordered that an incorpora-
tion election be held. 85 The election was held on May 18, 1982, and the
incorporation was approved by a unanimous vote of the 154 electors.8 6
On May 26, 1982, the Wasco County Court issued a Proclamation of
Incorporation in which the city of Rajneeshpuram ("Rajneeshpuram" or
the "City") was recognized as a putative municipal corporation under
Oregon state law. 87
As a duly incorporated municipality within the political subdivi-
dion of Wasco County, Rajneeshpuram may exercise the full range of
sovereign powers and authority delegated to municipal corporations
under the law of Oregon.8 8 Since its incorporation, Rajneeshpuram has
exercised these powers by organizing a city government, electing a city
council, and enacting a city charter. 89 The City Council, in which the
City has vested all its municipal powers,90 has subsequently established a
"peace force" certified under state law to provide the City's inhabitants
with police protection.9" It has also taken zoning and other land use
actions.92
In additon to delegation of certain powers, Oregon state law also
provides for the apportionment and distribution of certain state revenues
to Oregon cities.93 Consequently, the incorporated municipality of
Rajneeshpuram is entitled to receive a proportional share of these reve-
nues. Prior to December 31, 1983, the state distributed $10,484.86 in
state revenues to the City under various state revenue sharing statutes. 94
The Infrastructure of Rajneeshpuram
The ownership, organization, and governmental authority of
Rajneeshpuram is dispersed among four separate entities: Rajneesh In-
DI, col. 2. The investment in the ranch exceeds $100 million. Id. at D2, col. 5. Labor on the
ranch is considered "worship" and is done without pay by the disciples. This practice resem-
bles that of the Shakers who also receive no monetary compensation for their labor. Id.
85. Proclamation of Incorporation, Wasco County Court (May 26, 1982) (copy on file
with The Hastings Law Journal).
86. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 4, State v. City of Rajneeshpuram, No. 84-359
(D. Or. filed Mar. 28, 1984) (copy on file with The Hasting Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Complaint].
87. Id.
88. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 221.005-.106 (1983).
89. Complaint, supra note 86, at 6.
90. RAJNEESHPURAM, OR., RAJNEESHPURAM CHARTER OF 1982 ch. II, § 6.
91. Complaint, supra note 86, at 2.
92. Id.
93. The state is responsible for the proper apportionment and distribution of liquor tax
revenues, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 221.770, 471.810 (1983); cigarette tax revenues, id. § 323.455;
monies for use by cities in providing emergency communication services, ch 533, §§ 10-20,
1981 Or. Laws 565-67, as amended by ch 16, § 22, 1982 Or. Laws Spec. Sess. 27-28; and
portions of the State Highway Fund, OR. REV. STAT. § 366.790 (1983).
94. Complaint, supra note 86, at 6.
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vestment Corporation ("RIC"), Rajneesh Foundation International
("RFI"), Rajneesh Neo-Sannyas International Commune ("the Com-
mune"), and the City Council, acting on behalf of the City.
RIC is a "for profit" corporation doing business in and organized
under the laws of the State of Oregon. 95 In the fall of 1981, RIC was
incorporated for the purpose of engaging "in any and all lawful activity
for which corporations may be organized under O[regon] R[evised]
S[tatutes] Chapter 57"96 and was capitalized by means of a transfer from
RFI to RIC of the 64,229 acre Rancho Rajneesh in exchange for stock.97
RIC is the sole owner of Rancho Rajneesh, 98 which includes all the real
property, except one county road, within the entire City.99 Bhagwan
Shree Rajneesh's Secretary, or top aide, is a member of RIC's Board of
Directorsi °° and her husband is both a member of the Board and RIC's
president;10 1 together they constitute a controlling majority of that
Board.10 2 All of the directors and officers of RIC are Rajneeshees. 10 3
RFI is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the state
of New Jersey and doing business in Oregon. 104 It is a religious founda-
tion exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code.105 Its cor-
porate purpose is as follows:
This corporation is a non-profit organization organized exclusively for
charitable purposes and particularly for the spreading of religious
teachings and messages of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh which enables one
to enjoy life in its fullest dimensions; to achieve the state of universal
95. Articles of Incorporation of Rajneesh Investment Corporation art. II (Nov. 24, 1981)
(copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
96. Id.
97. Complaint, supra note 86, at 6.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Rajneeshpuram is situated entirely within the confines of Rancho Rajneesh and is
comprised of three separate parcels of land, which are joined only by Wasco County Road 305.
Road 305 is the only public thoroughfare and the only publicly owned property within the
City and Rancho Rajneesh. The portion of Road 305 which passes through and connects the
incorporated areas has been included within the City and has been redesignated "Sufi Road."
Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 8. Subsequent to the writing of the text, the Rajneesh's Secretary resigned her
positions in the Commune during the weekend of September 14, 1985, amid charges by the
Commune's top officials that she tried to poison a number of Commune members. San Fran-
cisco Chron., Sept. 17, 1985, at A3, col. 1. Therefore, the Note reflects her role as of the time
the State's complaint was filed.
101. Complaint, supra note 86, at 8.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. at 7.
104. RFI was incorporated in New Jersey in February 1978 under the corporate name of
"Chidvilas Rajneesh Meditation Center." Articles of Incorporation of Rajneesh Foundation
International (Dec. 1, 1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal). The Corporation
changed its name by amendment pursuant to OR. REV. STAT. § 57.716 (1981) in November
1981 after it began doing business in Oregon.
105. I.R.C. § 501(c) (1982).
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religiousness which is the essence and source of all religions by reviv-
ing and reexperimenting with the lost, hidden and esoteric techniques
of meditation which have existed in all the basic religions; to do any
other act or thing incidental to or connected with the foregoing pur-
poses or in advancement thereof. ... 106
RFI headquarters is located in the neighboring City of Rajneesh, for-
merly known as Antelope, Oregon. 10 7 In addition to marketing the
Rajneesh's books, video tapes, tape recordings, and photographs, 10 8
"RFI is a part of the organizational infrastructure through which
Rajneeshees conduct their religious practices."' 1 9  Bhagwan Shree
Rajneesh has assigned property rights to RFI110 and his Secretary is
RFI's president."' RFI owns all of the stock in RIC.12
In December 1981, RFI leased to the Commune all real property in
and surrounding the City.11 3 By the terms of the lease, RFI was granted
an option to lease back all or any part of the subject property for RFI's
use for religious purposes. 1 4 When RFI subsequently conveyed the
64,229 acres (including the real property of the City) to RIC, it assigned
its rights under the lease agreement to RIC, but expressly reserved all
leaseback rights. 1 5 Thus, RFI retains the power to lease back the prop-
erty for religious purposes. 1 16
The Commune is a nonstock corporation organized under the Ore-
gon Cooperative Corporation Act. 117 The Commune was incorporated
in December 1981 and its purpose is "to be a religious community whose
life is, in every respect, guided by the religious teachings of Bhagwan
Shree Rajneesh and whose members live a communal life with a common
treasury . ... 118 The Commune is governed by a Board of Directors
and its day to day business is conducted by corporate officers. The by-
laws of the Commune designate the Secretary of Bhagwan Shree
Rajneesh as an ex officio member of the Commune's governing body and
106. Certificate of Authority § 6 (July 6, 1981) (copy on file with The Hastings Law
Journal).
107. The Rajneeshees had not originally planned to settle in Antelope (now the City of
Rajneesh), but then moved in and established RFI headquarters because Oregon law forbade
them from conducting business outside an incorporated city. Washington Post, July 30, 1983,
at A3, col. 2.
108. Id.
109. Complaint, supra note 86, at 9.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 6.
113. Id. at 12.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 12-13.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Articles of Incorporation of Rajneesh Neo-Sannyas International (Dec. 23, 1981)
(copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
118. Id. art. III.
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give her control over admission to and expulsion from membership in the
Commune.'" 9 Applications for membership in the Commune are consid-
ered by the Board of Directors as a whole, but no one may be admitted as
a member without the Secretary's approval. 120 The Secretary's husband
is the "Senior Executive" of the Commune.1 2 1 All of the Commune
members are Rajneeshees. l22
The Commune owns a long-term leasehold on all of the Rancho
Rajneesh land.1 23 All city real property and offices, including City Hall,
are subleased or otherwise made available to the City by the Com-
mune.124 Consequently, all residents of the City are either members or
invitees of the Commune. 125
The City Council consists of five members,126 all of whom are
Rajneeshees. The mayor of Rajneeshpuram is also the Corporate Gen-
eral Manager of the Commune. On behalf of RIC, he has exercised cor-
porate powers and has acted as a spokesperson on behalf of RFI.1 27 The
Recorder and Treasurer of Rajneeshpuram is also Tresurer of the Com-
mune, a City Budget Committee member, and a city planning committee
("Committee for Citizen Involvement") member. Another council mem-
ber is a reserve officer on the Rajneeshpuram "Peace Force" and has
been employed by RFI.128
As the above description depicts, the governing power of
Rajneeshpuram rests in just a few hands. The interrelationship between
the City's governing bodies and the religious organization's highest au-
thority blurs the church-state distinction.
Religious Character of the City
In addition to the religious functions served by RFI and the Com-
119. Complaint, supra note 86, at 11.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id. at 10. This leasehold includes all of the real property (except the county road)
within Rajneeshpuram. Id.
124. Id. at 7-8.
125. See infra notes 164-65 & accompanying text. Most of the City, including City Hall, is
accessible only by means of roads operated by the Commune for its members and invitees.
Only a small portion of the City is accessible by use of Wasco County Road 305. The Com-
mune possesses and has exercised substantial direct control over visitor access to the City and
visitors' activities within the City. All visitors are asked to "check in" and may be required to
obtain a "visitor's pass" as a condition to frequenting or patronizing any facilities, other than
City Hall, which are not located directly on the county road right of way. Some visitors have
been required to submit to searches as a condition of access to the City. Complaint, supra note
86, at 12.
126. RAJNEESHPURAM, OR., RAJNEESHPURAM CHARTER OF 1982 ch. II, § 7.
127. Complaint, supra note 86, at 9.
128. Id.
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mune, the City itself has a distinct religious character. 29 Rajneeshees
assert that the development of a religious community at Rancho
Rajneesh is the fulfillment of a "religious vision" by the followers of
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, and that incorporation as a city is necessary to
provide essential services to members of their religion so that they can
practice the tenets of Rajneeshism. 30 The City functions as the world-
wide "spiritual mecca" for Rajneeshees, 131 and serves as both a monu-
ment to and a residence for Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. 132
According to Rajneesh religious tenets, work on the Ranch is a form
of worship: work stations conducted by the Commune are called "tem-
ples" and each temple is supervised by a religious "coordinator." Coor-
dinators meet frequently to discuss the unified work of the Commune.
Supervision by the Commune and religious designation extends to
Rajneeshpuram and its various "city functions," such as the provision of
police services. 133
The Current Controversy' 3 4
Based on the foregoing facts, the Oregon Attorney General's office,
on behalf of the State of Oregon, filed a complaint for declaratory re-
lief. 1 35 The state seeks a judicial determination as to whether it may rec-
129. In tribute to the Rajneesh master, the streets through the center of the City are paved
with red volcanic ash. Washington Post, July 30, 1983, at A3, col. 1. The City residents wear
red and orange, the colors of the sun. Id. The Complaint quotes the population of
Rajneeshpuram at 1,200 with 500 registered electors. Complaint, supra note 86, at 9
130. Complaint, supra note 86, at 16.
131. Mark Greenfield, as attorney for 1,000 Friends of Oregon, expects the Rajneeshees to
transform their commune into a booming city of 100,000 to accomodate the Rajneesh's
300,000 worldwide followers. That number would make Rajneeshpuram the second largest
city in Oregon. Rajneeshees maintain that 100,000 is a "little high," but have neither con-
firmed nor denied any precise figure. Washington Post, July 30, 1983, at A3, col. 3. The
Rajneeshees plan to make Rajneeshpuram a university community where Rajneesh's form of
meditation can be taught. Id. Currently, Rajneeshpuram serves as the site for three annual
religious festivals.
132. Complaint, supra note 86, at 17.
133. Id. at 13.
134. This Note addresses solely the first amendment issues involved in Rajneeshpuram's
incorporation and revenue sharing. The City, RFI, RIC, and their leaders have been and are
currently involved in substantial litigation on various issues. For example, some of the entities
involved in Rajneeshpuram have or do face suits pertaining to violation of federal public
accomodation laws, see San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 23, 1984, at A1, col. 1; defamation, see
Oregonian, Oct. 17, 1984, at C5, col. 2; and land use violations, see Perkins v. City of
Rajneeshpuram, 68 Or. App. 726, 686 P.2d 369 (1984); see also Friends of Or. v. City of
Rajneeshpuram, 64 Or. App. 755, 669 P.2d 1183 (1983).
The Bhagwan himself is facing deportation charges. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service in Portland maintains that he is not entitled to the status of a "religious worker" and
should be declared deportable. See Guru at Big Oregon Commune Facing Deportation, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1983, at A14, col. 2.
135. Complaint, supra note 86. The action was originally filed in the Circuit Court for
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ognize Rajneeshpuram as a lawful political subdivision of the state, and
whether it may provide the City with services and a share of state reve-
nues without violating the establishment clauses of the Oregon and
United States Constitutions.1 36 Because of this constitutional contro-
versy, the state refuses to recognize the municipal status of
Rajneeshpuram 37 and to provide it with further distributions of revenue
sharing funds. 138
The defendants,1 39 the City and its officials and residents, contend in
their answer to the State's complaint that Rajneeshpuram is lawfully in-
corporated according to Oregon law, and therefore is entitled to exercise
all of the sovereign governmental powers authoriied by the laws and the
Oregon State Constitution. 40 The defendents further contend that Ore-
gon law entitles the City to receive and expend state revenues.141 In ad-
dition, officials of Rajneeshpuram have demanded that the City's "Peace
Force" be given continuing access to the Oregon Law Enforcement Data
System, which is available to governmental law enforcement agencies,1 42
and that state officials charged with building code and land use adminis-
tration give effect to zoning and other land use actions taken by the
City.14 3 The City also demands that the State of Oregon accede to its
Wasco County, State of Oregon, on March 28, 1984. On March 29, 1984 the defendants
removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982). The state's mo-
tion for remand was denied. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1983, at A28, col. 1.
136. Complaint, supra note 86, at 2.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 5.
139. The state named as defendants: Rajneeshpuram, a putative Oregon municipal corpo-
ration; Wasco County, a political subdivision of the State of Oregon; Robert M. Brown, Sheriff
of Wasco County; RFI, a New Jersey corporation; RIC, an Oregon corporation; the Com-
mune, an Oregon corporation; Ma Anand Sheela, Secretary of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, Presi-
dent of RFI, member of RIC's Board of Directors, and ex officio member of the Commune's
Board of Directors; Swami Prem Jayananda, Ma Anand Sheela's husband, President of RIC,
Senior Executive of the Commune, and former Police Commissioner of Rajneeshpuram; Ma
Yoga Vidya, President of the Commune; Swami Krishna Deva, Mayor of Rajneeshpuram and
Corporation General Manager of the Commune; Ma Prem Archan, member of the
Rajneeshpuram City Council and of the City Budget Committee; Swami Deva Sandeesh, for-
mer City Council member and current member of the City Budget Committee and Commune;
Ma Prem Patipada, Rajneeshpuram City Council and Commune member; Ma Deva Jayamala,
Rajneeshpuram City Council and City Budget Committee member; Ma Sat Prabodhi,
Recorder and Treasurer of Rajneeshpuram, Treasurer of the Commune, City Budget Commit-
tee member, and Committee for Citizen Involvement member; and Ma Deva Rikta,
Rajneeshpuram City Council member, reserve officer on the City's "Peace Force," and former
employee of RFI, individually and as representative of the class of all current residents of
Rajneeshpuram. Id. at 1. Wasco county has been realigned as a plaintiff in this action.
140. Complaint, supra note 86, at 15; see also Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, State v.
City of Rajneeshpuram, No. 84-359 (D. Or. filed Aug. 16, 1984) (defendants moved to dismiss
the state's action under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
141. Complaint, supra note 86, at 18.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id. at 3.
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state law claim that the City is a duly constituted Oregon
municipality. 144
The State of Oregon contends that it has a valid constitutional de-
fense to the state law claims of the City, arguing that recognition of the
municipal status of the City and distribution of state revenues and serv-
ices to the City1 45 would violate the establishment clause of the United
States Constitution. 146
Because the validity of the City's incorporation depends upon the
determination of the constitutionality of the City, this Note now turns to
an analysis of that issue in light of the Supreme Court's Lemon test. 147
Establishment Clause Analysis of Rajneeshpuram
Religious Control
In order to analyze Rajneeshpuram under the establishment clause,
the "church-state" relationship existing in the City must be defined. This
requires a careful examination of the relationship between the religious
and governmental organizations of Rajneeshpuram.
Any consideration of the constitutionality of the relationship be-
tween the state and religion must address the fact that much of American
religious life is inherently associational,1 48 interposing the religious com-
munity or organization between the state and the individual believer.
Since the original colonists came to America in search of religious free-
dom, there have been numerous examples of Americans congregating
and settling in religiously homogeneous communities. Yet, never in the
history of this nation has the existence of a validly incorporated city been
challenged on establishment clause grounds, despite the fact that numer-
ous cities continue to exercise governmental powers for the benefit of
citizens of the same faith. These communities express the founding
Americans' commitment to establishing a haven where people could
practice their religion freely.
Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, more
commonly known as Mormons, present an excellent example of a homo-
geneous religious community. They fled from religious persecution in
Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois before finally settling in Utah, 149 where they
144. Id. at 15.
145. As of March 27, 1984, the state holds $11,018.66 in revenue sharing funds that the
City would be entitled to if it is found to be a valid municipality. Id.
146. Id. at 15. The state also contends that such recognition and distribution would vio-
late article I, §§ 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Oregon Constitution. Id; see infra note 171.
147. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
148. See M. ELIADE, SACRED AND PROFANE 20-24 (1959).
149. Farrell, Utah Inside the Church State, Denver Post, Nov. 21, 1982, (Magazine), at 22,
col. 1, 2.
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now constitute seventy-two percent of the population 150 and wield con-
siderable economic and political influence. I51 Some have dubbed Utah
"The Church-State."' 15 2 The governor of Utah, the mayor of Salt Lake
City, and all of Utah's congressmen and senators are Mormon. 53
Ninety percent of the state legislature is Mormon 154 and the Utah
Supreme Court has a Mormon majority.155 In many Utah counties,
ninety percent of local officials are Mormons1 56 and at least twenty-one
cities have city councils that are one hundred percent Mormon. 157
At first glance, Rajneeshpuram may appear not to differ greatly
from the Mormon communities, or from any other community in which
members with similiar religious beliefs have joined together to form a
municipality. Like many Utah cities, Rajneeshpuram has a government
elected by and representing a single religious group. The religious influ-
ence, however, goes beyond Rajneeshpuram's numbers and leaders.
Rajneeshpuram is more than just another religiously homogeneous com-
munity. In contrast to the freedom in Mormon communities to belong to
any religion, the City's residents are not free to reject Rajneeshism. 158
Furthermore, although the Mormon church owns a majority of the pri-
vate property in Utah, 159 the Mormon church does not and cannot pro-
hibit non-Mormons from entering its communities. In Rajneeshpuram,
however, a single religious entity owns all the City's property and has the
power to exclude non-believers. Thus, while non-adherents are free to
reside in Utah cities, they are not in Rajneeshpuram.160 These two dis-
tinctions, complete land ownership and absolute control over residence,
justify different constitutional treatment. The establishment clause does
not prohibit people of the same faith from gathering in self-government.
It does prohibit, however, religious control of government, the concept
embodied in the word "church-state" and the very "establishment" for-
bidden by the first amendment. Thus, although a particular religion's
adherents, such as the Mormons, may be free to incorporate a city, a
religious entity itself cannot.
To completely understand the difference between Mormon commu-
150. Id. at 22, col. 3.
151. See id.
152. See, e.g., id.
153. Id. at 22, col. 2.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 22, col. 3.
156. Id.
157. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST, CHURCHES AND CHURCH MEM-
BERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1980: AN ENUMERATION BY RELIGION, STATE &
COUNTY BASED ON DATA RECORDED BY III CHURCH BODIES (1982).
158. See Raineeshee Official Issues Ultimatum to Homeless Guests, Oregonian, Oct. 23,
1984, at 136, col. 2.
159. Farrell, supra note 149, at 22, col. 3.
160. See Oregonian, supra note 158, at 136, col. 1.
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nities and Rajneeshpuram, the infrastructure of Rajneeshpuram must be
explored. Technically, the four communal groups-RIC, RFI, the Com-
mune, and the City16 1-are four separate entities serving four distinct
purposes within Rajneeshpuram. The mere fact that some citizens par-
ticipate in more than one of the groups and wear both religious and gov-
ernmental "hats" is not per se unconstitutional.1 62 The constitutional
issue arises when these two "hats" coalesce. Put another way, when the
technically separate forms of legal organization, a city, a religious foun-
dation, a development corporation, and a religious cooperative, virtually
amount to the same religious entity under religious control, a constitu-
tional violation can occur.
Every city is controlled by its constituents, religious or otherwise,
for all democratic governing bodies are subject to the "coercive" nature
of the economic, political, and social pressures reflected at the ballot box.
Given the interlocking nature of its four communal groups, however,
Rajneeshpuram is subject to a much more direct religious control than
most other cities.
The power distribution within Rajneeshpuram illustrates this con-
trol. RFI is the sole owner of RIC, which in turn owns all the City's real
property. RIC leases all its property to the Commune, subject to RFI's
option to lease back for religious purposes. As stated previously,1 63 the
lessee Commune was created specifically to further the purposes of
Rajneeshism and is dedicated to creating and maintaining a religious
community guided by the teaching of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. The
Commune organizes city-wide events such as the annual festival, plans
civic projects such as land developments, and manages the City's
workforce in all its labors.
The City, in turn, receives all its property directly from the Com-
mune. The City actually was organized by the Commune to administer
the distribution of its leased property to its members. Thus, the City has
been created to implement the religious mission of both the Commune
and RFI.
As lessee, the Commune controls all the land in Rajneeshpuram. In
addition to controlling land ownership, the Commune controls resi-
dency.1 64 The Commune makes residential property available only to
161. The Rajneesh Humanity Trust foundation is a fifth corporation involved in Raj-
neeshpuram's infrastructure. The purpose of the foundation, directed by the Secretary of
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh as its president, is to aid the settlement of 2,000 homeless people in
Rajneeshpuram. San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 23, 1984, at A24, col. 6.
162. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978); see also infra text accompanying
notes 279-92.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 113-25.
164. If only Rajneeshees are permitted residence within Rajneeshpuram, the state's Proc-
lamation of Incorporation may also violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment by recognizing the incorporation of a municipal entity that discriminates on reli-
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individuals of the foundation's religious faith or their invitees. In fact, it
would be contrary to the Commune's stated purpose to admit anyone not
adhering to Rajneeshism. Thus, residency in the City depends upon
admission to the religious Commune, and continued residence is contin-
gent upon continued adherence to the faith.
Because eligibility for civic office is based on local residency, the
Commune can effectively oust officials from office by merely terminating
their residency. Therefore, the Commune has power to control city
officials. 165
The Commune's bylaws delegate the power over membership in the
Commune to the Secretary of Bhagwan Sheree Rajneesh, and designate
the Secretary as ex officio member of the Commune's governing body.
The Secretary is recognized as the spokesperson for the Commune's reli-
gious leader and has a power of attorney to speak and act for him on all
religious matters.1 66 The Secretary 67 is also president of RFI. Because
RFI is the sole shareholder in RIC, control over RFI is effectively con-
trol over RIC, the land owner. 168 As president of RFI, the Secretary
could at any time reclaim the City's land for religious purposes.
By virtue of the exclusivity of land ownership and the subsequent
gious grounds in their admissions policies. Only a person denied residence in Rajneeshpuram
on religious grounds would, however, have standing to raise this claim. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at
611 n.5.
165. If indeed only adherents of Rajneeshism are allowed to reside in the City and, conse-
quently, to hold city office, this may also violate the United States Constitution. Containing
the only language outside the Bill of Rights bearing directly on religion, article VI, § 3 states
that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust
under the United States." U.S. CONsr. art. VI, § 3. The clause applies only to the federal
government; however, article I, § 4 of the Oregon Constitution similarly prohibits religious
tests for office. Thus, any residency requirement based on religion affecting the right to hold
office would also violate the state constitution.
The establishment clause and the free exercise clause of the first amendment have also
been interpreted to forbid a state to condition public office upon an individual's religious be-
liefs. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 448 (1961) (invalidating an oath of belief in God
required of a notary public). Hence, a violation of article VI, § 3 is also a violation of the first
amendment. See State v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405, 417, 404 A.2d 1, 7 (1972).
It is not clear, however, whether this would be an alternative independent ground for
invalidation of the original incorporation, or whether a remedy may exist in judicial invalida-
tion of the restrictive residence policy. As a practical matter, the first amendment clauses are
dispositive in cases challenging alleged "religious tests," and the religious test clause is now of
little independent significance. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 414-15 (1950); Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
166. Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh has delegated to his Secretary the power to exercise control
over the affairs of the Commune.
167. The Secretary is also President of Rajneesh Humanity Trust foundation. See supra
note 161.
168. Even if it were not, the Secretary and her husband, the President of RIC, control RIC
by constituting a majority of its Board of Directors.
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control of residence, the Commune and RIC have effective control of the
City. Consequently, the incorporation of Rajneeshpuram as a city cre-
ates a power structure that subjects the city to the actual, direct control
of an organized religion and its leaders. 169
169. When faced with this substantive unity of religious control, a court might regard the
City, Commune, RFI, and RIC as one entity for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of
Rajneeshpuram's incorporation. In analogous cases the courts have "exalted substance over
form," have "pierced the corporate veil," and have found one entity to be the "alter ego" of
another. See, e.g., Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 294 Or. 94, 654
P.2d 1092 (1982) (under some circumstances corporate shareholders may be held liable if the
corporation is a mere "instrumentality" or "alter ego"); see also People v. Teolis, 20 Ill. 2d 95,
169 N.E.2d 232 (1960) (The mere ownership of all the realty in a municipality by one corpora-
tion, an association of the majority of the residents, does not in itself void the incorporation of
the municipality, but if in fact any private person or corporation was found to control a city for
its own private purpose, this would evidence an improper or illegal exercise of municipal gov-
ernment powers and bear upon the issues presented in a quo warranto proceeding.).
Similarly, in Martin v. Oregon Bldg. Auth., 276 Or. 135, 554 P.2d 126 (1976), the Oregon
Supreme Court held that an allegedly independent legal entity created to avoid the prohibition
on the incurring of indebtedness by the state was in fact the state, and that the "independence"
created in an attempt to validate the creation of a state debt was a "scheme which would fool
only a lawyer." Id. at 145, 554 P.2d at 131.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the importance of substance over form in Lemon:
This is not to suggest, however, that we are to engage in a legalistic minuet in which
precise rules and forms must govern. A true minuet is a matter of pure form and
style, the observance of which is itself the substantive end. Here we examine the
form of the relationship for the light that it casts on the substance.
403 U.S. at 614.
In general, when constitutional provisions creating fundamental rights and prohibitions
are concerned, courts interpreting the Constitution give strict scrutiny to governmental actions
infringing upon those provisions. In particular, strict scrutiny is given in cases of possible
governmental entanglement with religion. See, e.g., Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116; Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Commission for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
449 (1901).
By applying a standard of "strict scrutiny" in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507
(1945), the Court exalted substance over form by concluding that a private property owner was
required to allow religious solicitation, i.e., could not restrict first amendment rights, because
its property, although private, was the functional equivalent of a town or city.
The holding of Marsh Y. Alabama has been restricted to the facts of that case by recent
Supreme Court cases. It is now established that an owner of a privately owned shopping mall
may not be compelled to permit the exercise of first amendment rights on the property.
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308 (1968)); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Private property owners'
constitutional property rights are not outweighed by first amendment considerations unless the
private property has all the attributes of a town. Hudgens, 424 U S. at 520.
Rajneeshpuram is the functional equivalent of a religious organization. All four entities
are wholly composed of each other and are manifestations of one religious group. In essence,
RFI, RIC, the Commune, and the City are a single entity living on one budget. Thus, applying
"strict scrutiny" standards to the operations of Rajneeshpuram, a court would likely find that
these technically separate legal forms of organization are, in reality, alter egos of each other.
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Incorporation as a Municipality 170
This section analyzes whether the incorporation of Rajneeshpuram,
which bestows upon the community all the powers of a municipality,
constitutes a violation of the establishment clause. 7 1 It examines Ore-
170. This section of the Note does not discuss the possible invalidation of the municipality
for land use reasons. See Oregonian, Oct. 18, 1984, at C3, col. 1 (Oregon Supreme Court
agrees to hear case regarding invalidation of Rajneeshpuram for land use violations).
171. This Note addresses only the federal constitutional questions posed by
Rajneeshpuram's incorporation. The State of Oregon has brought claims under article I, §§ 2,
3, 4, and 5 of the Oregon State Constitution. Complaint, supra note 86, at 3. Oregon Constitu-
tional requirements, however, may be dispositive of the issues involved. See Deras v. Myers,
272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975) (federal Constitution is not controlling when a state constiti-
tion provides greater protections to the citizen).
In Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338 (1976), the
Oregon Supreme Court held that article I, §§ 2, 3, and 5 of the Oregon State Constitution,
prohibiting an establishment of religion, are co-extensive with the establishment clause of the
first amendment. While the court stated that the Lemon test was appropriate to determine a
statute's validity under the Oregon Constitution, Id. at 1013, 558 P.2d at 342, its recent deci-
sions on other constitutional issues exhibit a trend toward a greater reliance on independent
analysis of the Oregon Constitution. See, eg., State v. Caracher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942
(1982) (Oregon free to impose stricter standards on police conduct than fourth amendment
requires). This trend, if extended to the present issue, suggests that state and federal analysis
may produce different conclusions despite their reliance on identical tests.
For example, the Oregon Constitution sets forth a strict prohibition against the payment
of money for the benefit of religion, perhaps stricter than any federal requirement. Dickman v.
School Dist., 232 Or. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962). Oregon
Constitution article I, § 5 provides: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the
benefit of any religion or theological institution .... " OR. CONST. art. I, § 5. In Dickman,
the court held that the furnishing of school books to children in a parochial school violated
article I, § 5 because such assistance aided the school's religious, as well as secular, purposes.
Although the United States Supreme Court later held that such aid would not violate the
federal Constitution, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), Dickman still appears to be
the law in Oregon. Therefore, if the distribution of state revenue funds to the City benefits
religion, see infra text accompanying notes 214-64, such distribution would likely violate arti-
cle I, § 5 of the Oregon Constitution, independently of the federal constitutional issue.
Additionally, the article I § 5 prohibition may apply by analogy to local governments as
well as to the state government, thus subjecting Rajneeshpuram itself to the prohibition against
payment of money for the benefit of religion. Article I, § 5 applies to school districts, which
carry out functions of the executive branch of state government. Dickman, 232 Or. 238, 366
P.2d 533 (1961); Fisher v. Clackamas County School Dist. 12, 13 Or. App. 56, 507 P.2d 839
(1973). In Dickman and Fisher, the court did not consider the existence of state support for
public schools. It therefore appears that the word "Treasury" does not simply mean the State
Treasury, but is broad enough to include any public funds. Because cities, like school districts,
are created by state law to carry out purposes contemplated by state law, their funds seemingly
would be included within the scope of article I, § 5. Furthermore, the principles leading to the
adoption of article I, § 5 would be violated to the same extent by a city contribution to religion
as by a state contribution. Acccordingly, article I, § 5 is probably intended to reach any ex-
penditure for the benefit of religion by any government body. If this conclusion is correct, then
any expenditure by the City that benefits religion, see infra text accompanying notes 224-44,
would also constitute an independent violation of article I, § 5, of the Oregon State
Constitution.
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gon's Proclamation of Incorporation and the City's corporate existence.
Under Lemon, three characteristics must be present to justify state
action against an establishment clause attack: secular purpose, primary
secular effect, and absence of excessive entanglement. Thus, the first
question under the Lemon test is whether the state's recognition of
Rajneeshpuram as a municipality serves a secular legislative purpose.
Wasco County, for the State of Oregon, issued a Proclamation of
Incorporation for Rajneeshpuram.17 2 The purpose of this issuance ap-
pears to be a recognition of the will of the majority who voted on the
incorporation issue.1 7 3 Furthermore, the incorporation of a community
as a city has the secular purpose of providing the benefits of effective
local government to its inhabitants. Nothing in the Oregon statute per-
taining to incorporation or the proclamation suggests anything but a re-
ligiously neutral purpose. Certainly, any community, whether religious
or not, may incorporate as a city provided it obtains enough votes. Thus,
the proclamation of Rajneeshpuram as a municipal incorporation, as
with any municipal creation, furthers a legitimate secular purpose.
Independent of the first criterion, the state's proclamation must also
satisfy the second prong of the Lemon test: its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 174 The primary
effect of the state's act was to grant the City power to act as a municipal
government. The issue, then, is whether this recognition of
Rajneeshpuram as a city with sovereign governmental powers advances
or inhibits religion.
Under the "primary effect" analysis, an analogy may be drawn be-
172. By issuing a Proclamation of Incorporation, Wasco County, for the State of Oregon,
purported to acknowledge Rajneeshpuram's lawful incorporation and the City's entitlement to
exercise the sovereign governmental powers that the laws and the Oregon Constitution author-
ize cities to exercise.
One major source of municipal legislative authority in Oregon is the Oregon Constitution.
Article IV, § 1(5) and article XI, § 2, the municipal "home rule" provisions, reserve to the
people of the cities the right to adopt city charters. Home rule provisions enpower people to
confer jurisdiction over municipal affairs upon their city governments. A home rule charter
cannot empower a city to exercise jurisdiction over matters of statewide concern.
The people of Rajneeshpuram have adopted a city charter. The Rajneeshpuram City
Charter provides that "[tihe city shall have all powers which the constitution, statutes, and
common law of the United States and of this state expressly or impliedly grant or allow munic-
ipalities ...... RAJNEESHPURAM, OR., RAJNEESHPURAM CHARTER OF 1982 ch. II, § 4.
"The charter shall be liberally construed to the end that the city may have all powers necessary
or convenient for the conduct of its municipal affairs, including all powers that cities may
assume pursuant to state laws and to the municipal home rule provisions of the state constitu-
tion." Id. § 5.
173. The applicable statute states in pertinent part: "The county court calling the election
shall proclaim whether a majority of the votes cast on the proposition favors incorporation."
OR. REV. STAT. § 221.050(3) (1983).
174. See supra note 21 & accompanying text.
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tween this case and the situation in Larkin v. Grendel's Den.175 In Gren-
del's Den, the Court found that, by conferring upon churches a veto
power over governmental licensing authority, the state statute had dele-
gated legislative power to a religious body and, thus, had violated the
establishment clause. 176 In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that
the delegation of governmental powers to a religious body had the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion.' 77
Grendel's Den dealt with the exercise by a church of a comparatively
insignificant governmental power: a veto over the issuance of a liquor
license. By comparison, the Oregon State Proclamation of Incorporation
makes available to Rajneeshpuram the exercise of all the sovereign pow-
ers of a city, such as the right to levy taxes, to expend funds, to enact city
ordinances and regulations, and to establish a municipal court to enforce
those regulations. If such delegation of veto power to a church violates
the establishment clause, the incorporation of a religious community as a
city, with all its inherent legislative, executive, and judicial powers must
also violate that clause as an impermissible advancement of religion.
The circumstances of Rajneeshpuram and Grendel's Den differ in
one respect. In Grendel's Den, the state's authorization of governmental
power was to a church or religious organization; here the authorization
of governmental power is to a city with a constituency consisting of a
group of religious people. In short, a city is not the functional equivalent
of a church. This distinction, however, seems insignificant in light of the
religious uniformity and religious control of Rajneeshpuram. Effectively,
an organization formed for religious purposes and encouraging specific
religious beliefs serves the same function as a church.' 78 As demon-
strated earlier, 179 Rajneeshpuram is not merely a city whose inhabitants
just happen to be of the same religion; it is a city created for religious
purposes, built on land purchased for religious purposes, and wholly
composed of and controlled by a religious organization. Under these cir-
175. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
176. Id. at 126.
177. In fact, the court proclaimed the mere appearance of such a delegation to be a benefit
to religion: "In addition, the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by
church and state provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by
reason of the power conferred." Id. at 125-26; see also Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105
S. Ct. 3216, 3226 (1985) ("Government promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close
identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of any-or all-religious denomina-
tions .... ").
178. The term "church" can mean an organization for religious purposes and it "can also
have the more physical meaning of a place where persons regularly assemble for worship."
Guam Power Auth. v. Bishop of Guam, 383 F. Supp. 476 (D.C. Guam 1974) (citations omit-
ted). Under the latter definition, the Commune, and ultimately the City itself, is the functional
equivalent of a church; it is a "mecca" or place where Rajneeshees worldwide assemble for
worship. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 158-69.
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cumstances, to hold that the incorporation of Rajneeshpuram does not
have the primary effect of advancing religion would be to deny constitu-
tional guarantees under the guise of formalistic legal distinctions. As
Justice Rehnquist concluded in his dissent in Grendel's Den: "Surely we
do not need a three part test to decide whether the grant of actual legisla-
tive power to churches is within the proscription of the Establishment
Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."1 0
The primary effect of the State's Proclamation of Incorporation is to
allow Rajneeshpuram, a city controlled by religious entities, to wield co-
ercive state powers. The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in State v. Celmer.'8 ' In Celmer, a New Jersey statutory
scheme'1 2 granted various municipal powers to the Ocean Grove Camp
Meeting Association of the United Methodist Church (the "Associa-
tion"). The court held that these statutes violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment.1 83 The court reached this conclusion after
examining both the internal workings of the Association and the powers
granted to it by the legislature.
At the time it obtained its corporate charter, the Association
adopted a set of bylaws to regulate the internal affairs of the organiza-
tion. These bylaws stated that the main purpose of the Association was
"providing and maintaining for the members and friends of The United
Methodist Church a proper, convenient and desirable permanent camp
meeting ground and Christian seaside resort."' 8 4 To achieve this goal,
the Association retained title to all lands, streets, walks, parks and other
public places located in the camp grounds. 85 The property was then
subdivided and leased to persons "in sympathy with the objects of the
Association."'' 8 6 All transfers were, and remained, subject to the ap-
proval of the Association's president.
The bylaws also established a Board of Trustees, in which the legis-
lative and executive powers of the Association were vested.8 7 Responsi-
bility for the day-to-day operations of the community had been delegated
to the Board's executive, program, and development committees, which
were responsible respectively for the administrative, religious, and finan-
cial concerns of the Association .188
Over a period of years, the New Jersey legislature granted the Asso-
ciation's Board various police powers exercisable only by municipalities.
180. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 129 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
181. 80 N.J. 405, 404 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979).
182. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:97-1 to 97-8 (West 1967).
183. Celmer, 80 N.J. at 417, 404 A.2d at 6.
184. Id. at 411, 404 A.2d at 3 (citation omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 4i1, 404 A.2d at 3-4.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 412, 404 A.2d at 4.
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These powers included responsibility for the construction and mainte-
nance of public highways, streets, walks, and parks within the camp
grounds; veto power over public highway construction in Ocean Grove;
exclusive jurisdiction to make and enforce rules and regulations to pro-
mote and protect the public health and to prescribe penalties for this
violation; and the right to establish a municipal court to enforce their
ordinances.' 8 9 In effect, the legislature granted to the Association the
ability to function as a municipality.
In light of the Association's religious purposes, such a grant of mu-
nicipal powers violated the establishment clause by fusing secular and
ecclesiastical power: "Regardless, however, of the precise phraseology
that one utilizes to describe the First Amendment mandate, there can be
no question but that at a minimum it precludes a state from ceding gov-
ernmental powers to a religious organization."' 190
The circumstances in Celmer parallel the delegation of municipal
powers to Rajneeshpuram even more closely than does Grendel's Den.
The Commune, like the Association, has a stated religious purpose and
selects its members on the basis of religious criteria. The Commune
leases all the land to the City much like the Association, which granted
lots to persons of the same religious ideals. Like the Association Presi-
dent, the Secretary retains approval over residency. The City Council
and Commune directors serve the same day to day functions as the Asso-
ciation's Board of Trustees and committees. Like the Association, the
City, by virtue of its incorporation, has been granted all municipal pow-
ers. Thus, Celmer supports the conclusion that the Proclamation of In-
corporation violates the establishment clause.' 91
The third prong of the Lemon test requires that the state's act does
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 192 The state
Proclamation of Incorporation proclaimed Rajneeshpuram a duly incor-
porated municipality under the laws of Oregon.193 As a political subdivi-
sion of Wasco County and the State of Oregon, Rajneeshpuram has
continuous contacts with the state on many bureaucractic and adminis-
trative levels. Many state agencies must deal with Rajneeshpuram in
administering programs, issuing licenses, determining entitlements, dis-
189. Id. at 412-13, 404 A.2d at 4.
190. Id. at 416, 404 A.2d at 6.
191. Arguably, the recipient of governmental powers in these two cases is sufficiently dif-
ferent to distinguish the results. In Celmer, the Association as a religious body improperly
received municipal powers, whereas in Rajneeshpuram's case, the City Council as representa-
tives of the municipality, and not the Commune, that has received the identical powers. As
discussed earlier, however, in supra note 169, a court could find the Commune to be the alter
ego of the City, thereby leaving the analogy intact.
192. The "excessive entanglement" test analysis first appeared in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
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tributing state revenues, 194 and reviewing local government actions. This
constant interaction between the state and Rajneeshpuram, a city where
every facet of day to day existence is dedicated to the tenets of Rajneesh-
ism, provides an ongoing opportunity for excessive government involve-
ment with religion.
For example, the current litigation between Rajneeshpuram's corpo-
rate entities and the state's Land Use Board of Appeals ("LUBA") pro-
vides an opportunity for excessive state involvement. 195 The private
landowner RIC seeks to convert Rajneeshpuram into a booming urban
area; LUBA maintains that RIC's plan for converting the rural area vio-
lates current land use regulations. Any final decision regarding this issue
may implicate religious as well as legal considerations. For example, one
principal reason behind RIC's and Rajneeshpuram's plans is their desire
to establish a large urban community that will eventually house all
Rajneesh worshippers and students who wish to visit the "mecca" or join
its community. Because there are approximately 300,000 Rajneeshees
worldwide, any prohibitions on its land use may ultimately have an im-
pact on Rajneeshpuram's ability to serve as a gathering place for
Rajneeshees. Therefore, although LUBA is the appropriate forum for
land use adjudications, the state might necessarily become overly entan-
gled with religious concerns in its administrative dealings.
The state's Proclamation of Incorporation also fosters excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion by overlapping religious and civil
functions. In Grendel's Den, the Supreme Court concluded that while
"[s]ome limited and incidental entanglement between church and state
authority is inevitable in a complex modern society, . . the concept of a
'wall' is substantially breached by vesting discretionary governmental
powers in religious bodies."' 196
Furthermore, the "wall of separation between church and state" has
been breached in Rajneeshpuram. The state's Proclamation of Incorpo-
ration fuses religious and secular functions. 97 When a religious body
has the sole power to select the inhabitants and officers of a city, that
body effectively controls governmental power in that city. If a mere
transfer of legislative veto power to an eccelesiastical body results in ex-
cessive entanglement, granting municipal status and its accompanying
coercive powers to Rajneeshpuram also creates impermissible entangle-
ment. 98 In Rajneeshpuram, the religion is the communal corporation;
194. This problem is discussed in more detail infra text accompanying notes 214-64.
195. See Oregonian, Oct. 18, 1984, at C3, col. 1.
196. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 122-23.
197. This effect, the symbolic and actual union of government and religion in one enter-
prise, is an impermissible effect under the establishment clause. Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3216, 3227 (1983).
198. The result in Rajneeshpuram seems to embody the central evil of establishing "reli-
[Vol. 36
the communal corporation gives existence to the City; and the City is the
government. A clearer entanglement is unimaginable.
Another benchmark of impermissible entanglement is whether the
state action at issue would result in excessive monitoring of local authori-
ties. On any occasion when adherents of a particular creed also possess
governmental power, a legal tension may arise between the liberty of be-
lief to which they are entitled and the requirement of governmental reli-
gious neutrality. The religious character, land ownership structure, and
close intercorporate relationships of the City would probably require
state monitoring to ensure Rajneeshpuram's compliance with first
amendment restrictions.1 99
This monitoring would result in an impermissible entanglement of
government with religious affairs. 2°° For example, if the City chose to
establish a state-supported public school, the state might believe it neces-
sary to supervise its curriculum, textbooks, and teaching methods in or-
der to confirm that only secular subjects were being taught. It was this
type of entanglement between church and state that the Lemon Court
found to be excessive.20°
gious ... control over our democratic processes." Wolman n. Walter, 433 U.S. 224, 263
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
In Celmer, discussed supra text accompanying notes 181-91, the court concluded that
granting municipal powers to a religious entity fostered an excessive entanglement with reli-
gion. Celmer, 80 N.J. at 417, 404 A.2d at 6. The court found that the legislature had in effect
transformed the religious organization into the community's civil government and that "such a
fusion of secular and ecclesiastical power ... violate[d] both the letter and spirit of the first
amendment." Id.
199. Like the unrestricted powers bestowed upon the church in Grendel's Den, the sover-
eign powers conferred upon the City as a municipality are virtually limitless. The state's proc-
lamation does not provide assurances that the municipal powers will be exercised in a
religiously neutral manner. Moreover, given the religious character of Rajneeshpuram, there
are no "effective means of guaranteeing" that the power "will be used exclusively for secular,
neutral, and nonideological purposes." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780. The Court in Grendel's Den
placed great significance on a similar lack of assurances and guarantees. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. at 125.
In Lemon, the potential for impermissible use of government aid was based primarily on
the substantial religious character of parochial schools and on the religious authority over the
school system and teachers. 403 U.S. at 616-18. The Court, when faced with this potential,
concluded that government surveillance would therefore be required: "A comprehensive, dis-
criminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these
restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected." Id. at 619. Given the
extent of religious pervasiveness in Rajneeshpuram, it seems likely that the same concerns
would be invoked and that the same need for surveillance would therefore apply.
200. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619; see also Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 125 n.9; NLRB v. Catho-
lic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
547 (1983) (relating to the screening of textbooks by government officials).
201. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20. For another example of the need for state monitoring,
see infra text accompanying notes 254-64. This type of administrative regulation of religious
activities also endangers government neutrality in religious matters. When there is a high
degree of adminstrative contact and regulation, programs that survive regulation may appear
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As part of its excessive entanglement analysis, the Lemon Court also
considered whether a government act was likely to promote political di-
visiveness 20 2 along religious lines. 20 3 Indeed, Oregon's authorization of
government power by Rajneeshpuram has promoted political subdivision
and sectarian controversies. 2° 4 For example, an Albany, Oregon citizen
is waging a petition drive to place a measure on the state ballot asking
officials to force the Rajneeshees from Oregon.20 5 Also, three neighbor-
ing ranchers are charging that the creation of a city in the arid, barren
buttes of central Oregon violates the state's strict land use laws, 20 6 and
violence has been threatened by both sides. 20 7
to bear governmental approval. This impression echoes the impermissible symbolic benefit to
religion that the Court articulated in Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 125-26.
Furthermore, such regulation also endangers the freedom of religious societies by requir-
ing them to be responsive to government administrators in order to maintain the flow of bene-
fits and approval. Whether such regulation could constitute a free exercise claim would
depend on the coerciveness of the regulation, the impact on the religious society's beliefs, its
ability to practice those beliefs, and the degree of voluntariness in the society's response.
202. As part of its constitutional inquiry under the establishment clause, the Supreme
Court has looked at the degree of political divisiveness promoted by the challenged activity.
See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15, 372, 374-78 (1975); Lemon, 403 U.S. at
622-24. While political divisiveness alone cannot serve to invalidate otherwise permissible con-
duct, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364 (1984), it is a factor considered in the excessive
entanglement inquiry. J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1301; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
In Lynch, however, the Court intimated that, unless the case involved a direct subsidy to
religious institutions, an inquiry into political divisiveness is inappropriate. Lynch, 104 S. Ct.
at 1364-65; see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n.11 (1983). The Court neverthe-
less analyzed the political divisiveness element even though no direct subsidy was involved in
that case. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365. Therefore, political divisiveness is relevant in determining
the degree of government entanglement.
203. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
204. See generally Tension Building Over Oregon Sect, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, at 38,
col. 1 (city ed.).
205. Washington Post, July 30, 1983, at A3, col. 2.
206. Id.; see also The Oregonian, Oct. 20, 1984, at BI, col. 1.
207. The first major act of violence involving the sect occurred in Portland, Oregon, on
July 29, 1983, when three explosions hit a downtown hotel owned by the Rajneeshees. One
man was seriously wounded, and damage was estimated at more than $100,000. Washington
Post, July 30, 1983, at A3, col. 2. Later, an anonymous caller warned Bhagwan Shree
Rajneesh that a group in Seattle has offered $10,000 for someone to kill him. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1983, at 5, col. 6 (city ed.). More recently, the Secretary has warned that if hostilities
result in injury to any of her people they will be answered with violent revenge. San Francisco
Examiner, Sept. 23, 1984, at A24, col. 6.
The neighboring town of Rajneesh has also stirred its share of controversy. The last act of
the old Antelope city council was to deed back the city's church to its previous owner in order
to keep it out of Rajneeshee hands. Before that, the council attempted to disincorporate the
town to "keep it from being taken over by the disciples." N.Y. Times, April 17, 1982, at 7, col.
1 (city ed.). See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1982, at 32, col. 1 (city ed.) (discussion of
political division in Antelope, Oregon, between the "old" city council and the Rajneesh citi-
zens).
Prior to the move to Oregon, the settlement of Rajneeshees in New Jersey had also cre-
ated communal dissension. An aggressive corps of New Jersey citizens formed committees,
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Ordinarily, vigorous political debate is a healthy manifestation of
our democratic system of government. Political division along religious
lines, however, was one of the principal evils against which the first
amendment was intended to protect.20 8 The first amendment was
founded on the principle that a union between church and state leads to
persecution and civil strife.20 9
Rajneeshpuram is plagued by litigation210 and denounced in its
every move. Wasco County's issuance of municipal status to
Rajneeshpuram not only placed the city at the heart of civil litigation,
but also made it the target of religious controversy and political fire.211
In at least four ways then, the state's proclamation fosters an exces-
sive government entanglement with religious activities contrary to the
establishment clause: first, the state itself may become overly involved
with religion in its dealings with Rajneeshpuram; second, the granting of
municipal sovereignty to Rajneeshpuram enmeshes religion in govern-
ment functions; third, any surveillance of Rajneeshpuram by the state to
ensure "separatism" would result in impermissible government intermin-
gling with religion; and finally, the exercise of government power by the
Rajneeshpuram has resulted in political divisiveness along religious lines,
which will exacerbate the entanglement of Oregon's state and local gov-
ernments with religion.
In sum, Oregon's Proclamation of Incorporation, despite its valid
secular purpose,212 has the primary effect of advancing religion and fos-
pressured officials, and circulated petitions in an effort to "preserve the character of their com-
munity." N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1982, at 2, col. 1 (city ed.).
208. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. RV. 1680, 1692 (1969) (cited
with approval in Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 755 n.54 and in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622). Professor
Tribe points out that the ideal of separatism "calls for much more than the institutional sepa-
ration of church and state; it means that the state should not become involved in religious
affairs and that sectarian differences should not be allowed unduly to fragment the body poli-
tic." L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-3, at 819.
209. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1-18 (1947); id. at 28-74 (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-3, at 817-18. Basically, the framers feared the
danger of uniting the "cross and sword" in a single hand and of surrounding government in a
mantle of religious dogma.
210. The majority in Lynch noted that "[a] litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing
a lawsuit. . . create the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of entangle-
ment." 104 S. Ct. at 1365. Thus, the Oregon Attorney General could not rely on its own
actions as evidence of political controversy caused by the City's incorporation. This language
seemingly does not preclude the litigant from raising other lawsuits as examples of political
divisiveness. Accordingly, the Attorney General should be able to rely on other numerous
lawsuits involving Rajneeshpuram as evidence of excessive entanglement.
211. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., separate opinion);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
212. The Court's decision in Grendel's Den shows that even when a valid secular purpose
exists, the challenged activity might not be valid when the objective could be accomplished
readily through essentially nonreligious means. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 123-24. Here, Ore-
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ters excessive government entanglement with religion. Consequently, the
state's act in incorporating Rajneeshpuram violates the establishment
clause of the first amendment of the United States Constitution.2 1 3
State Revenue Sharing
Oregon's distribution of state revenues to Rajneeshpuram raises a
second major constitutional issue. Oregon has a state revenue sharing
system that distributes certain state revenue to its municipalities.2 1 4
These revenues, with the exception of state highway funds,2 1 5 are distrib-
uted to Oregon cities for general government purposes. As an Oregon
city, Rajneeshpuram is entitled as a matter of state law to a proportionate
share of these revenues. 2 16
As noted earlier, "neutrality" or "separatism" reflects the view that
religion and government function best if each remains independent of the
other.2 17 Implicit in this ideal is the principle that "under no circum-
stance should religion be financially supported by public taxation. '218
This section analyzes whether the allocation of state funds to
Rajneeshpuram through state revenue sharing violates this principle of
the establishment clause.
The Oregon legislative provision allowing for revenue sharing
among municipalities has a bona fide secular purpose. 2 19 The state col-
gon will necessarily provide police and fire protections to the Rajneeshpuram inhabitants
should the City be disincorporated. Therefore, there are other "nonreligious means" through
which the community can receive such vital services.
213. Even if a court would be unwilling to hold the state's proclamation a per se violation,
the City's incorporation may give rise to an in fact establishment clause violation.
The City's right to exercise municipal powers is subject to the restrictions and guarantees
of the first amendment. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. By incorporating as an Oregon municipal-
ity, Rajneeshpuram becomes in a constitutional sense "the state." As "the state,"
Rajneeshpuram must satisfy the mandates of the establishment clause in dealing with its indi-
vidual and corporate citizens. Therefore, any city act or ordinance may also be challenged
under the establishment clause.
214. See supra notes 93-94 & accompanying text.
215. State highway funds pursuant to OR. REV. STAT. § 366.790 (1983) must be used only
for purposes stated in § 3, article IX of the Oregon Constitution and the statutes enacted
pursuant thereto including OR. REV. STAT. § 366.514 (1983). In general, these purposes limit
expenditures of state highway funds to public uses, such as the improvement, repair, or
manitenance of public highways. State highway funds may not be used for private roads nor
for general municipal purposes.
216. See supra notes 93-94 & accompanying text.
217. See supra note 2.
218. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-3, at 819.
219. The fact that expenditures might coincide with religious beliefs does not preclude
their having a legitimate secular purpose. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 n.6
(1984). In Lynch, the Supreme Court clarified the secular purpose test. The test requires that
the challenged activity have a legitimate secular purpose, not "exclusively secular" objectives.
Id; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 440, 442 (1901). In fact, even when a govern-
ment act parallels a religious tenet of its beneficiary, such an act that is secular on its face and
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lects taxes in order to finance government. Municipalities are the local
"arms" of state government. Just as the states in Lemon had an interest
in enhancing the quality of secular education in all schools, Oregon has
an interest in apportioning its income among its various political subdivi-
sions for local expenditures.
Nonetheless, the propriety of the legislature's purpose may not im-
munize the law from further scrutiny.220 Accordingly, the statute must
also satisfy the second prong of the Lemon analysis:221 the statute must
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
At first glance, the religiously neutral statutes seem to pass this test
as well. The Oregon revenue statutes provide all municipalities with
state funds. Rajneeshpuram is merely one of the beneficiaries under a
statewide program of allocating income. Although the cumulative state-
wide effect of these revenue statutes may be religiously neutral, the actual
neutral in purpose does not constitute an establishment of religion. McGowan, 366 U.S. 420,
442 (1961); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-92 (1983); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980). The test is whether the expenditure or planning serves a legitimate
secular purpose, not whether it also has ties to a religious doctrine.
Furthermore, the City's act cannot be invalidated merely because it would require in-
volvement with religious entities. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-9, at 839-40. The
Supreme Court made this result clear when it stated that Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899), "dispels any notion that a religious person can never be in the State's pay for a secular
purpose. . . ." Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976). In fact, if the
City refused to assist in planning and financing public functions with an organization merely
because it was religious, it would probably violate the free exercise clause by taking a position
in opposition to religion. As stated in Everson v. Board of Education, "[The First Amendment]
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used
as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." 330 U.S. at 18.
On the other hand, expenditures or planning that coincides with religious beliefs may not
have a sufficiently secular purpose. Because Rajneeshpuram is first and foremost a religious
community (such a state of affairs is not only evident from its name, but also from the purposes
underlying its formation, its internal structure, and the various activites that it undertakes),
every city expenditure may be suspect.
Consider a city ordinance providing for funding and improvements in preparation for an
annual religious festival. To what extent do expenditures, planning, and engineering for such a
city improvement have a clearly secular purpose when every such improvement directly affects
and benefits the religious commune or property owner? See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1368
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon is whether
the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.); cf.
Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) (city's financial and other assist-
ance to the archdiocese of Philadelphia for a mass and sermon to be delivered by Pope John
Paul II resulted in an establishment clause violation), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
220. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
221. Even if it cannot be shown that a governmental policy was aimed at a religious
aspect of behavior, if the essential effect of the government's action is to influence-
either positively or negatively-the pursuit of a religious tradition or the expression
of a religious belief, it should be struck down as violative of the free exercise clause if
the effect is negative, and of the establishment clause if positive.
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-9, at 839 (emphasis in original).
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distribution of state funds to Rajneeshpuram raises serious constitutional
questions. The issue is whether the distribution of state revenues to
Rajneeshpuram has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.222
To determine whether a program has a sufficiently secular effect, the
Court asks whether the secular impact is sufficiently separable from the
religious impact, and whether the class benefited is sufficiently broad 223
to include religious and non-sectarian groups. In other words, the Court
looks to see if a particular program has the effect of singling out religious
groups as its beneficiaries.
The aim of any municipal expenditure is to benefit the city's resi-
dents and property. For example, the furnishing of fire and police pro-
tection obviously confers a private benefit to residents and their property,
and yet municipal expenditures on such protections are proper municipal
functions and benefit the public community as a whole. In fact, it is
difficult to imagine any city-funded service or activity that is not intended
to benefit the public as a body; and the city's inhabitants as individuals.
The distribution of state funds to a city that comprises only members of
one religion, however, by its very nature advances that particular
religion.
Such a benefit would, however, be separable from and only inciden-
tal to its primary effect of providing secular municipal benefits. The ex-
penditure of state funds in order to provide such services cannot be
invalidated simply because it incidentally benefits a religion or citizens in
the practice of that religion.224 Like all municipalities, Rajneeshpuram
must provide municipal services to its residents. The mere provision of
these services in a religious community cannot be construed as having
222. It might be argued that a facially neutral statute which distributes funds to all of the
cities in a state, only one of which happens to be controlled by a particular religious organiza-
tion, does not have a primary effect of advancing religion. A constitutional breach of the estab-
lishment clause, however, is not measured by a statistical analysis. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775.
The Nyquist Court stated that direct aid to religion does not have a "consitituionally permis-
sive ceiling" because it is clear from the cases that such aid "in whatever form is invalid." Id.
at 780.
223. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-9, at 840.
224. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771. For examples of state programs conferring only incidental
benefits to religions, see Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (state funds
authorized to private religious institutions for separate secular activities); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734 (1973) (sustaining a state bond proposal to benefit a Baptist college); Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal aid to subsidize construction of buildings to be used for
secular activities at a religious college held not to have a religious effect); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 296 (1970) (tax exempt status for religious institutions as nonprofit organi-
zations held not to constitute establishment); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S 236 (1968)
(upholding free secular textbooks to parochial schools); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (Sunday closing law upheld); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimburse-
ment for bus transportation to Catholic parochial schools upheld).
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the primary effect of advancing religion.225 Rajneeshpuram's corporate
and religious infrastructure suggests, however, a direct link between state
funds and sectarian benefits that exceeds a merely incidental provision of
municipal services.
The added difficulty in the case of Rajneeshpuram is that every city
expenditure will benefit only a single property owner226 because all City
property is owned by one entity, RIC. Any land development projects,
city improvements, or community ameliorations will increase the land's
value and thereby benefit its owner. The religious Commune, as RIC's
tenant, as the City's lessor, and as occupant, is the current beneficiary of
any and all such improvements. While the Commnune and its members
will receive the practical advantages of land developments in everyday
life, RIC, as the property owner, will receive all accrued long-term bene-
fits. Ultimately, any benefits RIC receives are also benefits to RFI, as
RIC's sole stockholder.
225. Professor Tribe notes that the mere fact that there is an incidental benefit to a reli-
gious organization or to religion itself does not invalidate a government act when the primary
purpose and effect is to further a secular rather than religious end. L. TRIBE, supra note 2,
§ 14-9, at 889-40.
226. The single property owner as beneficiary poses an additional problem under Oregon
state law. Article XI, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution provides in part: "No county, city,
town, or other municipal corporation, by vote of its citizens or otherwise, shall become a
stockholder in any joint company, corporation or association, whatever, or raise money for, or
loan its credit to or in aid of, any such company, corporation, or association. ... OR.
CONST. art. XI, § 9. By its terms, article XI, § 9 was designed to curb speculation, which in
many instances resulted in pecuniary loss to the taxpayer. Johnson v. School Dist., 128 Or. 9,
12, 270 P. 764, 765 (1929); see also 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 186 n.4 (1983).
Article XI, § 9 and similar provisions have given birth to the "public purpose" doctrine.
Simply stated, the doctrine holds that public money cannot be appropriated for private pur-
poses. The Oregon Supreme Court has adopted a very broad test to be applied in determining
whether an expenditure of government funds satisfies the restrictions of the public purpose
doctrine. In Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 438 P.2d 725 (1968), the court stated
that "'[t]he only valid criterion would seem to be whether the expenditures are sufficiently
beneficial to the community as a whole to justify governmental involvement.' " Id. at 341, 438
P.2d at 730 (quoting Note, Incentives to Industrial Relocation: The Municipal Industrial Bond
Plans, 66 HARV. L. REv. 898, 903 (1953)); see also Miles v. City of Eugene, 252 Or. 528, 532,
451 P.2d 59, 61 (1969); Nicoll v. City of Eugene, 52 Or. App. 379, 628 P.2d 1213 (1981).
With respect to expenditures of public funds by cities, the cases generally hold that, if
there is a substantial public benefit, the expenditure will not be unlawful merely because a
private purpose is also served. See, eg., Carruthers, 249 Or. at 341, 438 P.2d at 730. Hence,
an expenditure of general benefit to all property in a city ordinarily could be made without
possible objection even if some private benefits are gained.
In Rajneeshpuram, however, city expenditures uniquely and exclusively benefit corporate
citizens. Publicly funded land improvements that accrue to a single landowner may violate the
public purpose doctrine by calling into question the substantiality of the public benefit gained
by those expenditures. If the court found this to be true, the public purpose doctrine violation
may represent independent state grounds for the invalidation of Rajneeshpuram. At a mini-
mum, the courts undoubtedly would review religious affiliations, this scrutiny would trigger
the third prong of the Lemon test--excessive entanglement. See infra notes 245-64 & accom-
panying text.
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Consider, for example, the creation of a university in Raj-
neeshpuram. Assume that the City by ordinance expends state funds to
finance this project. 227 As the City's citizens, the Commune and its
members will enjoy the benefits of the day to day use of the university;
they will be able to educate themselves and their children, as well as have
access to a scholarly library. Should the City disincorporate or the Com-
mune's lease expire, however, the university will remain for the benefit of
the property owner, RIC. Because RFI wholly owns RIC, any economic
benefit received by RIC is income to RFI. RFI's option to lease back the
City's property further complicates this scenario: if at any time RFI
should exercise its option to lease back all the City's property, all city
improvements, including the university, would accrue to it as lessee.
Furthermore, because RFI's option allows it to lease back the land for its
religious purposes, the university and all such improvements may ulti-
mately exist for the use and enjoyment of religion.
The Supreme Court struck down a part of federal aid program for
this very reason. In Tilton v. Richardson,2 2 8 while sustaining almost all
aspects of a federal aid program to church-related colleges, the Court
unanimously struck down one clause of the federal statute in question.
22 9
Under that clause, the government was entitled to recover a portion of its
grant to a sectarian institution in the event that the constructed facility
was used to promote religion by converting the building to a chapel or
otherwise allowing it to be "used to promote religious interests. ' 230 Be-
cause the statute provided that the penalty for religious use would expire
at the end of twenty years the facilities would thereafter be available for
use by the institution for any sectarian purpose. In striking down this
provision, the plurality opinion emphasized that "[limiting the prohibi-
tion for religious use of the structure to 20 years obviously opens the
facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period."' 23' The original
federal grant would then be advancing religion.2 32 A leaseback to RFI
for religious purposes would produce the same impermissible effect that
the Tilton Court invalidated.
The corporations and the Commune have complete control of the
City. Payment of state funds to the City is in effect the payment of state
funds to the corporations, to the Commune, and ultimately to religion.
2 33
227. Any expenditure by the City may also pose a separate and independent constitutional
problem. Rajneeshpuram, as a political subdivision of the state, must also adhere to establish-
ment clause requirements. Due to the narrowness of the class benefitted, however, any City
expenditure could raise serious constitutional questions. See Nyquist, 413 U.S at 794.
228. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
229. Id. at 683.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. It should be noted that the City can spend revenues on the maintenance, expansion,
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Thus, despite the secular purposes of the revenue statutes, the distribu-
tion of public funds to Rajneeshpuram amounts to a direct benefit to
religion. 234
Unlike Walz v. Tax Commission,235 which upheld tax exempt sta-
tus 236 for all educational and charitable nonprofit institutions,237 the dis-
tribution of state funds to the City constitutes successive annual
appropriations that benefit only one religious group.238
Furthermore, the use of this money is controlled by that same reli-
gious group.239 The payments to the City under the revenue statutes are
or improvement of Wasco County Road 305, the sole publicly owned strip of land in
Rajneeshpuram. Even these expenditures, however, would indirectly benefit the Rajneesh cor-
porations and Commune; public road improvements generally would increase accessibility to
the City and raise neighboring property values. Again, because all land adjacent to the county
road is owned by RIC, it would indirectly benefit from such improvements.
234. If the Court finds that payments to the City are equivalent to payments to religious
organizations, the distribution of state revenues to Rajneeshpuram may also violate the free
exercise clause of the first amendment by indirectly channeling the monies of taxpayers of
many faiths to the City for the propagation of one faith. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 627-28
(Douglas, J., concurring).
235. 397 U.S. 296 (1970).
236. Id. at 680.
237. Id. at 673. The Court has also considered the breadth of the class benefited in sus-
taining particular forms of aid to nonpublic school pupils. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
238. It may be argued that the true beneficiaries of the state statute are all the residents of
Rajneeshpuram and not merely the corporate arms of Rajneeshism. In Rajneeshpuram, how-
ever, residence is apparently predicated on religious affiliation. (If the court finds this to be the
case, the state's distribution of funds to Rajneeshpuram may also violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment by providing state assistance to a community that discrim-
inates on religious grounds in their admission policies. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611 n.5.) As
demonstrated earlier, the owner corporation and its cooperative lessee may limit residence in
Rajneeshpuram to those who satisfy their particular residence requirements. Any resident
who fails to meet these conditions may be required to leave. Indeed, the Secretary, president of
the Rajneesh Humanity Trust, told the 3,500 newcomers to Rajneeshpuram as part of Trust's
"homeless" project that "if you're going to be here, you're going to participate in the pro-
gram." 'Non-Participation'Leads to Ejection from Commune, Oregonian, Oct. 22, 1984, at Bl,
col. 2. Among other things, participating in the program "means going to the drive-by" and
watching Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh drive by in one of his Rolls- Royces. Id. Attendance at the
Saturday mass meeting is also mandatory. Id. at BI, col. 6. Non-participation has already led
to some expulsions. Id. at BI, col. 1. Thus, in effect, residents may enjoy the benefits of City
expenditures only by sufferance of the single property owner and its lessee. In fact, this resi-
dency requirement merely demonstrates the extent to which the distribution's secular impact is
indeed inseparable from its religious impact.
239. When faced with a statute that allowed discretionary use of government funds, the
Nyquist Court concluded:
No attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures related to the upkeep
of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes, nor do we think it possible within
the context of these religion-oriented institutions to impose such restrictions . ..
Absent appropriate restrictions on expenditures for these and similar purposes, it
simply cannot be denied that this section has a primary effect that advances religion
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not payments for services rendered, nor are they for a specific proper
purpose. Instead, the payments are for any municipal purpose deter-
mined by the City in its discretion. The City Council in which the City's
municipal powers are vested exercises that discretion on the City's be-
half. The City Council is elected by an electorate subject to the control
of the Commune and RIC, which are themselves religious entities.
Given this political control, the City Council may be pressured into ap-
propriating money for religious purposes.24° There is no guarantee that
the City Council will use these payments in exclusively secular ways. 24'
Absent such guarantees, these payments could be used to promote reli-
gious ends.242
Given this "potential for impermissible fostering of religion, '243 Or-
egon's distribution of public funds to Rajneeshpuram has the primary
effect of advancing religion. As stated by the Court in Nyquist, "[i]n the
absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived
from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and
nonideological purposes, . . . direct aid in whatever form is invalid."'244
Although the Commune and the inhabitants of Rajneeshpuram are enti-
tled to receive the same municipal services as all other residents of the
state, a city, county, or state cannot provide public funds to a religious
organization to be used in its discretion. Therefore, although Oregon
revenue statutes might be facially neutral and provide funds to all munic-
ipalities state wide, their application to Rajneeshpuram results in direct
in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secon-
dary schools.
413 U.S. at 774.
240. The Supreme Court considers this pressure to commingle secular and sectarian pur-
poses a serious threat to the establishment clause mandate. For example, in concluding that a
state statute had the primary effect of advancing religion, the Court in Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball noted that the danger arises "not because the public employee [is] likely deliber-
ately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather because the pressures of the
environment might alter his behavior from its normal course." 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3225 (1985)
(quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247 (1977)); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
241. [A] mere statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee that state funds will
not be used to finance religious education . . . . The Rhode Island Legislature has
not, and could not, provide state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular
teachers under religious discipline can avoid conflicts. The State must be certain,
given the Religious Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion ....
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 778-79 (quoting in part Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619) (emphasis in the origi-
nal); see also Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) ("[T]he state is
constitutionally compelled to assure that the state-supported activity is not being used for
religious indoctrination.").
242. This potential for abuse parallels the Grendel's Den Court fear that a standard less
delegation of veto power would enable a church to favor its members. The Court concluded
that this mere possibility for abuse violated the second prong of the Lemon test. See supra note
74.
243. Lemon, 463 U.S. at 619.
244. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780 (emphasis added).
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aid to a religious organization and, therefore, has the improper primary
effect of advancing religion. Payments to religion cannot be upheld be-
cause the religion has taken on the form of a city.
Under the third prong of the Lemon test, excessive entanglement, 45
the state action must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion.2 46 Because "[t]he test is inescapably one of degree, '2 47 the
Supreme Court has devised guidelines for an "excessive entanglement"
inquiry: "In order to determine whether the government entanglement
with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of
the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the state
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority. 2 48 This subsection applies these guidelines to ascer-
tain whether the state's payments to Rajneeshpuram promote an uncon-
stitutional degree of governmental involvement in religion.
As demonstrated above,2 49 the beneficiaries of Oregon's payments to
Rajneeshpuram are RIC, the Commune, RFI, the City Council, and the
City's inhabitants. Both RFI and the Commune expressly declare in
their articles of incorporation that their raison d'etre is to follow the
teaching of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh;2 50 thus, their character and pur-
poses are admittedly religious. RIC is a seemingly neutral investment
corporation, but, as RFI's wholly owned subsidiary, it too takes on reli-
gious overtones. 251 Finally, the City Council members and the City in-
habitants are Rajneeshees and members of the Commune; as Commune
members and devout Rajneeshees, their goal is to create a religious com-
munity in which to live and teach. Indeed, Rajneeshpuram is the prod-
uct of that mission. Thus, the character and purposes of the group that
benefits from Oregon's payments to Rajneeshpuram are religious.
The Lemon Court found that this type of pervasively religious char-
acter and purpose led to an excessive involvement with religion.252 In
245. The Court in Nyquist found that it was unnecessary to address the excessive entangle-
ment issue because the state's act had the primary effect of advancing religion. Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 780. In other words, if a state act has the primary effect of advancing religion, it might
by necessity involve excessive government entanglement with religion. This is true because, in
a religious environment, governmental supervision is needed to guarantee that government
funds are furnishing only secular benefits. Yet, it is this very same supervision within a reli-
gious context that breached the third Lemon prohibition against excessive involvement with
religion. Thus, once a court has determined that the allocation of state revenue to
Rajneeshpuram primarily benefits religion, a separate determination that the allocation also
involves excessive entanglement may be unnecessary.
246. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
247. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1984).
248. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
249. See supra notes 226-27 & accompanying text.
250. See supra notes text accompanying notes 106, 118.
251. See supra text accompanying note 112.
252. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-20.
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Lemon, the benefited schools had a substantial religious character, the
teachers were subject to religious control and discipline, and the religious
authority pervaded the entire school system.2 53 Under those circum-
stances, government contact with the school required involvement with
religion.
In Rajneeshpuram, all of the benefited groups have a significant reli-
gious character, the City Council members and City inhabitants are sub-
ject to religious control,2 54 and religion pervades the entire City and its
infrastructure. As in Lemon, the religious character and purposes of the
benefited group may lead to excessive government involvement with
religion.
The nature of the aid is another factor considered in the excessive
entanglement inquiry.2 55 There are two crucial questions: first, whether
the aid requires government involvement; second, whether this involve-
ment would call for official and continuing government surveillance.
Unlike Walz, in which the government "aid" was merely an exemp-
tion and not a transfer of funds,2 56 the Oregon revenue statutes provide
for a direct money subsidy to Rajneeshpuram. As the Walz court noted,
direct money payments clearly require substantial government involve-
ment.2 5 7 Additionally, this aid would require continuing governmental
surveillance. The Oregon statutes do not provide for a single allocation
of state funds, rather they set up an enduring system under which annual
appropriations are calculated and distributed. This revenue sharing sys-
tem could lead to administrative entanglement: "the history of govern-
ment grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that such programs
have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of control
and surveillance. ' 258 Thus, the nature of the aid to Rajneeshpuram also
promotes the need for government contacts with a religiously dominated
community.
The relationship that would result from Oregon's distribution of
funds to Rajneeshpuram further denotes impermissible entanglement.
Given the religious character of Rajneeshpuram, virtually the only way
253. Id. at 616-17.
254. See supra notes 163-69 & accompanying text.
255. See supra text accompanying note 248.
256. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. The Walz court concluded that "[the grant of a tax exemp-
tion is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches
but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state . . . .There is no
genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion." Id.
257. The Walz Court stated that "[o]bviously a direct money subsidy would be a relation-
ship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could en-
compass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or
administrative standards." Id. (cited with approval in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621).
258. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621.
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to ensure that the City's expenditures were for secular purposes would be
to place strict restrictions on the use of the City's funds.
It may be argued that the state need not monitor any City activities.
In Board of Education v. Allen,259 the Supreme Court rejected the con-
tention that a statute which permitted loaning school books to private
schools could be misused to provide religious schools with religious liter-
ature. The Court stated that "[a]bsent evidence, we cannot assume that
school authorities. . . are unable to distinguish between secular and reli-
gious books or that they will not honestly discharge their duties under
the law.''260 Given this language, the state cannot presume that City
officials will ignore religious neutrality in their dealings with
Rajneeshpuram's religious entities. This suggests that there would be no
need for the state to monitor the City's activities and to determine the
secular propriety of each expenditure.
The difference between the state aid in Allen and the state aid to the
City makes this argument unpersuasive. In Allen, the state provided
school books to private schools. School authorities then inspected the
books to ensure their religious neutrality. These inspections did not lead
to excessive government entanglement with religion. Here, the state is
providing financial assistance to the City for its discretionary use. Unlike
that of school books, the religious neutrality of city officials is not readily
ascertainable. Even if a determination could be made, authorities cannot
determine conclusively that City officials will remain neutral.
The Lemon Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to paro-
chial school teachers: "Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected
once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs
and the subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment. 261 The Court concluded that "[a] comprehensive, discrimi-
nating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to
ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment other-
wise respected. ' 262 An examination to assure that each City expenditure
259. 392 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1968).
260. Id. at 245.
261. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
262. Id. Four years after Lemon, the Court went even further in finding a need for govern-
ment surveillance. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of several new forms of aid to nonpublic schools. Among other forms of assistance,
the statute provided for auxiliary guidance, testing, and remedial and therapeutic services by
public school employees who would provide services at the private schools. The state sought
to avoid a religious effect by using its own employees to provide assistance in developing purely
secular educational skills. In this way, the state hoped to avoid the necessity for a surveillance
of the teachers and programs, which might constitute an excessive entanglement. See id. at
371-72.
The Court, however, found the use of state employees insufficient to guarantee a purely
secular program. Id. The majority recognized the possibility that even a public school em-
ployee might advance religious ends in such a situation. Consequently, the Court held that it is
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has both a secular purpose and a primarily secular effect would involve
subjective judgments as to what the religious purposes of the foundation
and the Commune are, and how the action could inhibit or advance
those purposes. It would be necessary to examine the motivations and
purposes of city officials, the cumulative effects of their actions upon the
community and the degree of intracity government involvement with
religious entities. In particular, the government would have to inspect
and evaluate the City's financial records, community projects, and ordi-
nances in order to determine which expenditures, if any, might be relig-
iously motivated or have primary religious beneficial effects. Thus, the
surveillance and enforcement necessary to ensure the secular use of state
funds constitute "prophylactic contacts [that] will involve excessive and
enduring entanglement between state and church. '263
Taken as a whole, the government intrusion into a religious commu-
nity through distribution of public funds, restrictions necessarily imposed
impossible to avoid all possible religious effects even in secular programs for remedial students,
without official supervision of the programs on a scale that would result in a prohibited form of
entanglement. Id. The monitoring of religiously affiliated city officials in a pervasively reli-
gious community would likely entail as much government involvement with religion as would
the supervision of state employees working in parochial schools.
263. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. Professor Nowak has discussed the particular dangers in-
volved with administrative entanglement:
Additionally, this type of involvement may undermine the neutrality of government
itself. A high degree of regulation will require some formal administration to ensure
that the day-to-day regulations are followed and that reporting requirements are met.
However, in the long run, administrators and those who are being regulated fre-
quently develop a mutuality of interest. It is in the interest of the public administra-
tors to please those who are regulated in order to maintain their position and increase
the power of their agency. Similarly, it is in the interest of the regulated entities to
accommodate, if not control, those who regulate them so that they will receive
favorable rulings in areas where the administrators exercise some discretion. This
mutuality of interest can lead to the "capture" of administrative agencies by those
whom they are supposed to regulate and make it difficult to determine whether such
agencies are acting on behalf of the public or the regulated entity. There is no reason
to believe that the regulation of religious activities would follow a different pattern.
J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1046. Professor Nowak cites Larkin v. Grendel's Den as an exam-
ple of his proposition that the excessive entanglement branch of the establishment clause test
was meant to avoid the danger to both secular government and religious autonomy that ac-
companies a sharing of power and entanglement of adminstrative agencies. Id. at 1046 n.6
(citing Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116).
The Court's language in Lemon supports Professor Nowak's "capture" theory. There,
the Court discussed the natural tendency of governmental programs to take on a life of their
own: "[M]odern governmental programs have self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensi-
ties. These internal pressures are only enhanced when the schemes involve institutions whose
legitimate needs are growing and whose interests have substantial political support." Lemon,
403 U.S. at 624. The Court analogized between this expansive propensity of governmental
programs and the potential "downhill momentum" of constitutional theory, suggesting that
the constitutional approval of a relatively innocuous governmental benefit to religion is the first
step in an inevitable progression that ultimately leads to the establishment of state religion. Id.
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on the appropriate use of those funds, and the surveillance required to
enforce those restrictions culminates in an excessive entanglement with
religion. 264
In summary, the state wide application of Oregon's revenue statutes
has a legitimate secular purpose. In the statutes' application to
Rajneeshpuram, however, the primary effect is to advance religion by
providing public aid to religious organizations. Furthermore, the stat-
utes enmesh the state in administrative involvement with Rajneeshpuram
and thereby foster exessive entanglement with religion. Thus, the appli-
cation of the Oregon statutes to Rajneeshpuram violates the establish-
ment clause.
Free Exercise of Religion Analysis
Any analysis of Rajneeshpuram's constitutionality under the estab-
lishment clause must be balanced against the first amendment's parallel
religious guarantee: the free exercise of religion. 265 The free exercise
clause prohibits government proscription of religious beliefs. 266 It does
not, however, automatically preclude the regulation of all activities that
have religious implications.2 67 Yet, the essential question is whether the
government action impermissibly burdens a religious belief by regulating
an action important to the practice of that religion. 268
In general, the burden imposed by the state action on religious prac-
tices is balanced against the state's interest in the regulation.2 69 The
party challenging the state action must first show that the law burdens
the practice of his or her religion.270 The state must then demonstrate a
significant secular reason for the challenged law.271 In balancing the two
interests, the Court has considered the degree of the burden imposed on
264. As the Lemon Court concluded, "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship
arising under the statutes ... involves excessive entanglement between government and reli-
gion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. There have been no political controversies (other than the
Attorney General's suit) directly related to the allocation of state funds to Rajneeshpuram.
Consequently, this Note does not address the potential political divisiveness created by Ore-
gon's payments.
265. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The free exercise clause was first held applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
266. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a state requirement that a
person take an oath that required a belief in God in order to qualify for public employment).
267. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
268. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1053-54.
269. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361 (1974); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
270. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
271. Id.
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the religious practice,2 72 the importance of the secular interest fur-
thered,273 the extent to which that interest would be impaired by accom-
modating the religious practice,274 and the availability of less restictive
means to achieve the state's interest.2 75 If the state interest is truly signif-
icant, the state action and consequent burden on religious practice is per-
missible, 276 provided that the state interest could not be accomplished by
means less burdensome to the religious practice.277 On the other hand, if
the state's interest is of a lesser magnitude, the state must accommodate
the religious practice. 278
A relatively recent Supreme Court decision, McDaniel v. Paty,279
provides a helpful application of this balancing test to a "free exercise"
challenge. 280 In McDaniel, a Tennessee statute barred clergy from public
office. 281 This provision was the basis of a suit by a candidate defeated by
a cleric in a state election, who argued that the elected candidate should
be disqualified under the statute because he was an ordained minister.
The Court unanimously found that the statute was unconstitu-
272. Id. at 215-17; see also Johnson, 415 U.S. at 385.
273. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-30; see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719; Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982).
275. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940).
276. See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 260; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 ("[A]ny incidental burden on
the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a compelling state interest in the
regulation .... "). See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1054.
277. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 1054.
278. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. See generally J. NOWAK,
supra note 2, at 1054.
279. 435 U.S. 618 (1978); see Ripple, supra note 22, at 1210-12, 1227-29 (discussing the
case as an example of the application of the entanglement test in the free exercise clause con-
text and the resulting confrontation between the religion clauses).
280. The seminal cases establishing the Court's free exercise balancing test are Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For the purposes
of this Note, however, McDaniel v. Paty is analyzed because it raises issues analogous to the
present case. Both cases question if and when a religiously motivated person or group may
"constitutionally" wear both religious and secular hats.
281. At the time of the Constitution's adoption, a majority of states had enacted such
provisions to prohibit an establishment of religion. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM 118 (rev. ed. 1967) (citing S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY 507 (1970)). One of the most obvious characteristics of church-state
union is the exercise of political power by the clergy, a fact evidenced by the history of colonial
Massachusetts. See W. SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 87-89 (1965). By 1978,
however, only the Tennessee provision remained in effect. Tennessee had barred ministers
from serving as delegates to the state's constitutional convention by statute; this statute mir-
rors the following state constitutional provision:
Whereas Ministers of the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to God and
the care of Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their func-
tions; therefore, no Ministers of the Gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever,
shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the Legislature.
TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. VIII, § 1, quoted in McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621 n.l.
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tional.282 Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion283 held that the dis-
qualification statute violated the free exercise clause because it
conditioned McDaniel's right to the free exercise of his religion on the
surrender of his right to seek office.284 Justice Burger first asserted that
the minister's free exercise rights were not absolute2 85 because the statute
operated against the minister's "status" 286 and not his belief.287 The
state's infringement on the minister's religiously motivated activities
could only be justified, however, by state interests "of the highest or-
der. '288 While Tennessee asserted that its interest was to prevent entan-
glement of church and state in the civil lawmaking function of the
legislature,289 the Court found that that interest was not sufficiently im-
portant without a showing of current validity290 to justify an infringe-
ment of the minister's free exercise rights. In other words, given
Tennessee's failure to demonstrate the reality of the alleged dangers of
clergy participation in the political process, 291 the state's infringement on
free exercise could not withstand the constitutional challenge. 292
Application to Rajneeshpuram
Oregon's denial of municipal status to Rajneeshpuram may place a
burden on its inhabitants' right to freely exercise their religion. The
Rajneeshees could allege that the religious community's existence hinges
on its incorporation as a municipality, and argue that a self-sufficient
municipality is essential to their religious autonomy. In other words, the
community could contend that its religious beliefs and practices require
its removal from secularized society,293 and that therefore it could not
282. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 629. In so holding, the Court reversed the Tennessee Supreme
Court, which had decided in favor of the defeated candidate, Paty. Paty v. McDaniel, 547
S.W.2d 897, 910 (Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Although the case was decided
without dissent, no majority opinion was rendered because the justices could not agree on a
single rationale to support the result.
283. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 620 (plurality opinion).
284. Id. at 626 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406).
285. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627.
286. Id.
287. Id. For this reason, the Chief Justice concluded that Torcaso did not control the case
and that the law was, therefore, not automatically invalid as "depriving the clergy of a civil
right solely because of their religious beliefs." Id. at 626. Yet, Justices Brennan and Marshall
in their concurrence saw no real distinction between a religious belief and the act of declaring a
belief in religion, such as one's calling to the ministry. Id. at 634-35 (Brennan, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 628 (plurality opinion) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
289. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628; id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 628.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 628-29.
293. This is essentially the same argument used by the Amish community in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In their free exercise attack on Wisconsin's compulsory public
school attendance law, the Amish argued that their ability to educate their children at home
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successfully be integrated in another community without forfeiting its
constitutional right of free exercise.2 9
4
Certainly, a group of people with a common interest have a right to
form a city and then "take over" that city by getting their candidates
elected.2 95 In particular, Oregon acknowledges the right of its adult citi-
zens to organize themselves and create a municipality. There is no con-
stitutional basis to disqualify such a group of citizens from this political
activity merely because their common interest arises out of their religious
affiliation. 296 Rajneeshees are citizens of the United States and thus are
entitled to enjoy secular benefits and privileges without regard to their
religion.297 As the Court noted in McDaniel, with respect to holding
public office,2 98 the state cannot condition the exercise of a constitutional
right upon the surrender of another. Here, Oregon apparently seeks to
after the eighth grade was a critical component to their entire way of life, which is dictated by
their religion. Id. at 209-13.
294. In response to this argument, Oregon could point out that Rajneeshpuram's actions
contradict this contention. For example, Rajneeshees have successfully integrated themselves
in the neighboring town of Rajneesh, see supra note 79, and have actively sought the inclusion
of "outsiders" within their community. See supra note 161. In any case, Rajneeshpuram thus
far has not made any such contention.
295. Professor Tribe states that "[t]o strike down a public choice on the sole ground that it
incidentally makes religious actions easier or less costly would clearly be to single out religious
groups for hostile treatment, contrary to the mandate of the first amendment's free exercise
clause." L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-9, at 840; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (first amend-
ment does not require state to be the adversary of religion).
296. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495-96; see also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 640-41 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("Religionists no less than members of any other group enjoy the full measure of
protection afforded speech, association, and political activity generally."); Walz, 397 U.S. at
670 ("adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions
on public issues . . . of course, churches, as much as secular bodies and private citizens have
that right"). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-12, at 866-67 ("American courts have
not thought the separation of church and state to require that religion be totally oblivious to
government or politics . . . . [t]o view such religious activity as suspect, or to regard its
political results as automatically tainted, might be inconsistent with first amendment freedoms
of religious and political expression . ) (cited with approval in McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641
n.25 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Moreover, as the Lynch Court noted, the first amendment does not require this type of
total separation: "No significant segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in
a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government.
'It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation
.... '" Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359 (quoting in part from Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 256, 760 (1973)).
297. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[G]overnment may not use
religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or bene-
fits."); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (the state "cannot exclude . . . the members of any
other faith because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation." (emphasis in original)). See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablish-
ment, and Doctrinal Development, Part II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV.
513, 527 (1968).
298. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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deny Rajneeshpuram citizens the right to incorporate as a municipality
based on their religious affiliations. If the incorporation of
Rajneeshpuram is essential to the continued existence and autonomy of
the religious community, the disallowance of its existence would seem to
impose an unconstitutional penalty on free exercise.2 99 Furthermore, in-
validating Rajneeshpuram's incorporation as a city and denying it access
to state revenues due to its religious character would seem to classify its
existence on the basis of religion,3 0° and thereby run afoul of both reli-
gion clauses.30 1
On the other hand, although Rajneeshpuram citizens have the same
guaranteed rights of all citizens of the United States, those rights must be
exercised within constitutional bounds. "Clearly freedom of belief pro-
tected by the free exercise clause embraces freedom to profess or practice
that belief," 30 2 but "that does not mean that the right to participate in
299. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 633 (Brennan, J., concurring).
300. Some commentators have argued that the government should be "religiously blind"
and follow a "strict neutrality theory," which would prohibit classification in terms of religion
either to confer a benefit or impose a burden. See, eg., P. KURLAND, supra note 2, at 18;
Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection: Religion in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964); cf. L.
TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-4, at 819-23 (discussing the "strict neutrality theory"). See gener-
ally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 64-67 (1964).
In fact, some commentators have argued for "political neutrality," which would permit
the inclusion of religious associations in any governmental scheme whose secular purposes
justify such inclusion. See, e.g., Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American
Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333, 348 (1950); Giannella, supra note 297, at 519. The
argument is that, if religious voluntarism is to be a reality, then religious groups, as part of the
community, should share in benefits accorded to the public generally. Id. at 519.
Under both of these theories, government programs that benefit religion, such as the in-
corporation and revenue sharing in Rajneeshpuram's case, would be permitted as long as no
religious classifications were employed. P. KURLAND, supra note 2, at 80-85. See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-4, at 821. The Court has, however, consistently refused to adopt
these theories. Indeed, the Court has held that religious classifications not only are permitted
in some instances, but at times are even required. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (state must modify its unemployment compensation requirement of willingness to work
Mondays through Saturdays in order to accomodate the needs of those religiously opposed to
working on Saturday); cf. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("such rigid
conceptions of neutrality have been tempered by constructions upholding religious classifica-
tions where necessary to aviod '[a] manifestation of... hostility [toward religion] at war with
our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of
religion.'" (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ. 333 U.S. 203, 211-212 (1948)).
301. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 630, 632, 635 n.8, 636 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan found that in addition to violating the free exercise clause, Tennessee's disqualifica-
tion statute also violated the establishment clause by having a primary effect which inhibits
religion. Id. at 636.
302. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring). It should be remembered, however, that the
judgment of the Court distinguished religious beliefs from acts that manifest that belief. Id. at
626-27 (plurality opinion). The Court hesitated to give sweeping first amendment protection
to all religious practices and acts because "the absolute protection afforded belief by the First
Amendment suggests that a court should be cautious in expanding the scope of that protection
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religious exercises is absolute . . . ,,303 The state's "interests of the
highest order" 304 can "overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion. '30 5
In McDaniel, Tennessee asserted that its interest in preventing the
establishment of a state religion was of the highest order.306 The Court
refused "to inquire whether promoting such an interest is a permissible
legislative goal,"' 30 7 however, because Tennessee failed to demonstrate
that its establishment clause concerns had current validity.30 8 The Court
found that without such a demonstration, "the American experience pro-
vides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office
will be less careful on anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their
oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts. '30 9 Therefore,
the Supreme Court concluded that the state interest was not sufficiently
compelling310 to justify the burden imposed on free exercise. 311
Here, assuming arguendo that the state's denial of municipal status
and state revenues would burden Rajneeshpuram's citizens' free exercise
of religion, the state's interest in the present case is significantly different
from that in McDaniel and would likely dictate a different outcome.
First, the means used by Tennessee to implement its interest is distin-
since to do so might leave government powerless to vindicate compelling state interests." Id.
at 627 n.7 (emphasis in the original).
303. Id. at 631 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, even Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, acknowledged that although "a sharp distinction cannot be made between reli-
gious belief and religiously motivated action," id., "[w]e have recognized that 'even when the
action is in accord with one's religious convictions, [iut is not totally free from legislative re-
strictions.' " Id. (quoting from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)).
304. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
305. Id. at 215, quoted with approval in McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628.
306. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 629.
307. Id. at 628.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 629.
310. Justice Brennan argued that the establishment clause cannot "be used as a sword to
justify repression of religion or its adherents from any aspect of public life":
The State's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and strife may not be accomplished
by regulating religious speech and political association. The Establishment Clause
does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it,
simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and there-
fore subject to unique disabilities. Government may not inquire into the religious
beliefs and motivations of officerholders-it may not remove them from office merely
for making public statements regarding religion, or question whether their legislative
actions stem from religious conviction.
In short, government may not as a goal promote "safe thinking" with respect to
religion and fence out from political participation those, such as ministers, whom it
regards as overinvolved in religion.
Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
311. Id. at 629 (plurality opinion). But cf id. at 635 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring) (balanc-
ing test unnecessary because Tennessee's statute violated the free exercise clause by establish-
ing a religious classification as a basis for qualification for political office).
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guishable from that employed by Oregon. In McDaniel, Tennessee flatly
prohibited the political participation of ministers in the legislature.312
Oregon, on the other hand, has not expressly conditioned the right to
participate in government upon the surrender of religious free exercise.
Nor has Oregon sought to condition municipal status or financial assist-
ance on religious abstinence. Oregon is not absolutely barring the incor-
poration of all religiously uniform communities or statutorily prohibiting
economic aid to all religious groups; the state is merely insisting that
given the particular facts and power structure of Rajneeshpuram, the in-
corporation of the community would be inconsistent with the first
amendment.313 While persons of the same faith who choose to live in the
same area can incorporate a city, a religion itself cannot. Of course, a
religious commune can adopt rules for its own governance or protection
of its unique cultural and spiritual characteristics. The religious com-
mune, or any other religious or private body, may also call upon the
sovereign power of the state to aid in the enforcement of those rules. The
commune may not, however, exercise that sovereign power itself. Thus,
Oregon does not seek to invalidate a coalition of individuals who happen
to share certain religious beliefs, but rather to block the union of religious
and civil functions inherent in the exercise of governmental power by
religious bodies.314
Second, the nature of the state's establishment clause interest in Mc-
Daniel differs from that proferred here by Oregon. In McDaniel, the
state feared the political participation of religious leaders in general.315
Here, however, Oregon does not attempt to deny individuals the right to
participate in government, 316 but seeks to prevent the establishment of a
local government subject to religious control. 317 Furthermore, while
Tennessee failed to show that clergy participation in politics posed any
real or current constitutional danger,31 8 Oregon can demonstrate a real
potential for constitutional conflict within the incorporated commu-
312. Id. at 620.
313. See Complaint, supra note 86.
314. Additionally, in Tennessee, the prohibition used to implement the state's establish-
ment clause concerns was not only sweeping, but also statutory. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 620.
This raised the question of whether "establishment prevention" is a proper legislative goal.
Here, however, the state is seeking judicial relief. Complaint, supra note 86. Unlike the state
legislature, the judiciary as constitutional interpreter is the appropriate forum for establish-
ment clause enforcement. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("with
judicial enforcement of the establishment clause"). Thus, the Oregon legislature has avoided
creating self-determining evaluations of the first amendment's guarantees and has left the bal-
ance between the religion clauses to be determined by the courts.
315. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628-29 (plurality opinion).
316. This point is supported by the fact that the state has not claimed that the existence of
the neighboring City of Rajneesh violates the establishment clause. Rajneeshees currently hold
five of the town's six city council member seats. See supra note 79.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 163-69.
318. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628-29.
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nity.3 19 This potential conflict is caused by religious control over resi-
dency, land ownership, and civic expenditures. 320  Finally, while
Tennessee could have readily detected a particular cleric's violations of
neutrality in office, Oregon would have to monitor and evaluate the con-
duct of an entire city, its officials, and each of its sovereign acts in order
to ascertain violations by Rajneeshpuram. 32 1 The governmental intru-
sion posed by this surveillance would itself constitute an establishment
clause violation. Thus, unlike the Tennessee statute, Oregon's refusal to
incorporate and fund Rajneeshpuram constitutes the least restrictive
means of protecting and enforcing its legitimate establishment clause
concerns.
322
Not only are Tennessee's and Oregon's interests of a different degree
and nature, their impact on the free exercise of religion also differs
greatly. In McDaniel, the burden on free exercise was both direct and
severe: an individual simply could not be both a minister and a legisla-
tive delegate. In contrast, Oregon's invalidation of the City's incorpora-
tion would place only a minimal burden, if any at all, on religious
practices. There is no significant deprivation of free exercise of religion
merely because the property on which the religion may be practiced can-
not take on the attributes of a city. 323 Additionally, Oregon does not
challenge the right of its citizens to join together with fellow believers to
develop and reside in a religiously inspired communal environment in
which every aspect of their daily life is a form of worship, guided by the
teachings of a religious leader.
324
319. See supra notes 174-213, 226-64 & accompanying text.
320. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 629 (plurality opinion).
321. See supra notes 193-201, 245-64 & accompanying text.
322. This choice parallels the one made by the Court in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674-76 (1970). In Walz, the Court had to choose between granting tax exempt status to
churches or taxing them, both of which require government involvement with religion. Id.
The Court allowed the exemption and concluded that taxing churches would actually give rise
to greater government involvement with religion than would the exemption. Id. In general,
the state activity that requires the least amount of government entanglement with religion is
constitutionally preferable. Thus, because Oregon's invalidation of the City's corporate status
would require less government entanglement with religion than would surveillance of the com-
munity to ensure compliance with the establishment clause, it is less restrictive and constitu-
tionally preferable.
323. State v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405, 420, 404 A.2d 1, 8 (1979). A free exercise claim in this
context is relevant, if at all, only to the question of how land use regulations may be enforced
against a religious community. See generally Oregonian, Oct. 27, 1984, at C2, col. 1. If, for
example, the only way that a religious community could comply with restrictions on popula-
tion density was for the community to incorporate as a city, it is possible that the community
could assert a free exercise right to an exemption from the land use laws. The appropriate
accomodation of religion in that case would, however, arguably be to exempt the community
from the requirement that it obtain city status, not to confer upon the community the sweeping
sovereign powers that city status carries with it. For an example of such an accommodation,
see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
324. Complaint, supra note 86, at 4.
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Furthermore, unlike Tennessee, Oregon is not prohibiting individu-
als who preach Rajneeshism from running for or holding public office.
Nor is the state depriving citizens of political rights because of their reli-
gious beliefs. Oregon is merely refusing to allow religious leaders to in-
corporate their own city to achieve political power.
In summary, McDaniel presented the Supreme Court with a con-
frontation between the establishment and free exercise clause barriers. 325
The present case does not, however, create a similar conflict because the
state's invalidation of one of its municipalities and denial of state funds to
that municipality would not inhibit the free exercise of religion. Even
assuming arguendo that such a conflict exists, the establishment clause
prohibition on allowing a religion to exercise governmental authority
should be given greater weight than the minimal burden imposed on the
community's free exercise of religion.326 The issue is not whether the
state's citizens have the right to religious freedom, for the Constitution
guarantees each individual that freedom; but whether the incorporation
and financial aiding of a religious community under the present facts can
be squared with the dictates of the establishment clause. No church, syn-
agogue or religious foundation can constitutionally acquire sovereign
state powers by bringing its adherents into its privately owned property
to incorporate as a city. The free exercise clause cannot be used to pro-
tect the religion's actions when those very actions would have been pro-
hibited by the establishment clause had the religion not acquired the
attributes of a city. In other words, the free exercise clause should not be
used as a tool for bringing about establishment clause violations. The
free exercise clause cannot grant with one hand what the establishment
clause has forbidden with the other.327
Conclusion
Oregon's proclamation recognizing Rajneeshpuram's incorporation
as a municipality, and Oregon's distribution of state revenues to
Rajneeshpuram, violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Each of these acts have a primary effect that advances religion, and each
excessively entangles government with religion.
Moreover, the state may deny corporate municipal status and a pro-
portional share of state revenues to Rajneeshpuram without violating the
free exercise clause of the first amendment. Should a court find that the
325. Constitutional Dilemma, supra note 2, at 581.
326. "The state must maintain an attitude of 'neutrality' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhib-
iting' religion, and it cannot, by designing a program to promote free exercise of religion, erode
the limitations of the Establishment Clause." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 256, 758 (1973) (syllabus); see also id. at 788-89. But see Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972).
327. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788-89.
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free exercise clause is at issue in the Rajneeshpuram case, the state's com-
pelling establishment clause interests would likely outweigh any inciden-
tal burden on free exercise. Absent a showing of a heavy and direct
burden imposed on the religious community by such denials, the first
amendment's establishment clause principles must govern.
As the United States Supreme Court forcefully summarized in
Larkin v. Grendel's Den:32 8
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be
entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches
excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution decrees that
religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the
institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and
entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.
329
The Court must draw such a line at Rajneeshpuram.
Janice L. Sperow*
328. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
329. Id. at 307 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625).
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